Ludwig Wittgenstein

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Ludwig Wittgenstein

35. Portrait of Wittgenstein.jpg

Portrait of Wittgenstein on being awarded a fellowship by Trinity College, Cambridge, 1929

Born

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein

26 April 1889

Neuwaldegg, Vienna, Austria-Hungary

Died

29 April 1951 (aged 62)

Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, England

Nationality

- Austrian (until 1939)[1]

- British (from 1939)

Education

- Technische Hochschule Berlin (Diplom, 1908)

- Victoria University of Manchester (PhD, not completed)

- Trinity College, Cambridge (PhD, 1929)

Notable work

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Philosophical Investigations

Era

20th-century philosophy

Region

Western philosophy

School

- Analytic philosophy[2]

- Anti-foundationalism[3]

- Anti-essentialism

- Therapeutic approach

- Linguistic turn

- Logical atomism (early)

- Logical behaviorism[4]

[5] (disputed)

Institutions

Trinity College, Cambridge

Thesis

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1929)

Doctoral advisor

Bertrand Russell

Notable students

G. E. M. Anscombe, Rush Rhees, Casimir Lewy,[19] Reuben Goodstein,[20] Norman Malcolm, Alice Ambrose, Maurice O'Connor Drury, Margaret MacDonald, Friedrich Waismann, Morris Lazerowitz

Main interests

Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of mind, epistemology, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of perception

Notable ideas

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Influences

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Influenced

Military career

Allegiance

Austria-Hungary

Service/

Austro-Hungarian Army

Years of service

1914–1918

Rank

Lieutenant

Unit

Austrian 7th Army

Battles/wars

World War I

Awards

- Military Merit with Swords on the Ribbon

- Silver Medal for Valour, First Class

- Band of the Military Service Medal with Swords

Website

wab

wittgen-cam

Signature

Ludwig Wittgenstein signature.svg

Part of a series on

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein (second from right), summer 1920

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Early philosophy

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Later philosophy

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Movements

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Works

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People

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Interpreters

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Other topics

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (/ˈvɪtɡənʃtaɪn, -staɪn/ VIT-gən-s(h)tyne;[21] German: [ˈluːtvɪç ˈjoːzɛf 'joːhan ˈvɪtɡn̩ʃtaɪn]; 26 April 1889 – 29 April 1951) was an Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.[22] He is considered by some to be the greatest philosopher of the 20th century.[23]

From 1929 to 1947, Wittgenstein taught at the University of Cambridge.[22] In spite of his position, during his entire life only one book of his philosophy was published, the 75-page Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung (Logical-Philosophical Treatise, 1921), which appeared, together with an English translation, in 1922 under the Latin title Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. His only other published works were an article, "Some Remarks on Logical Form" (1929); a book review; and a children's dictionary.[a][b] His voluminous manuscripts were edited and published posthumously. The first and best-known of this posthumous series is the 1953 book Philosophical Investigations. A survey among American university and college teachers ranked the Investigations as the most important book of 20th-century philosophy, standing out as "the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations".[24]

His philosophy is often divided into an early period, exemplified by the Tractatus, and a later period, articulated primarily in the Philosophical Investigations.[25] The "early Wittgenstein" was concerned with the logical relationship between propositions and the world, and he believed that by providing an account of the logic underlying this relationship, he had solved all philosophical problems. The "later Wittgenstein", however, rejected many of the assumptions of the Tractatus, arguing that the meaning of words is best understood as their use within a given language game.[26]

Born in Vienna into one of Europe's richest families, he inherited a fortune from his father in 1913. Before World War I, he "made a very generous financial bequest to a group of poets and artists chosen by Ludwig von Ficker, the editor of Der Brenner, from artists in need. These included Georg Trakl as well as Rainer Maria Rilke and the architect Adolf Loos."[27] Later, in a period of severe personal depression after World War I, he gave away his remaining fortune to his brothers and sisters.[28][29] Three of his four older brothers died by separate acts of suicide. Wittgenstein left academia several times: serving as an officer on the front line during World War I, where he was decorated a number of times for his courage; teaching in schools in remote Austrian villages, where he encountered controversy for using sometimes violent corporal punishment on girls and a boy (the Haidbauer incident) especially during mathematics classes; working during World War II as a hospital porter in London, notably telling patients not to take the drugs they were prescribed; and working as a hospital laboratory technician at the Royal Victoria Infirmary in Newcastle upon Tyne. He later expressed remorse for these incidents, and spent the remainder of his life lecturing and attempting to prepare a second manuscript for publication, which was published posthumously as the hugely influential Philosophical Investigations.

An ardent critic of modernity and the scientism that he detected among his colleagues,[30] he famously proclaimed in a remark published in Culture and Value —

It is all one to me whether or not the typical western scientist understands or appreciates my work, since he will not in any case understand the spirit in which I write. Our civilization is characterized by the word 'progress'. Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features. Typically it constructs. It is occupied with building an ever more complicated structure. And even clarity is sought only as a means to this end, not as an end in itself. For me on the contrary clarity, perspicuity are valuable in themselves. I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as having a perspicuous view of the foundations of possible buildings.[31]

In the words of a friend and literary executor, Georg Henrik von Wright, he believed that —

His ideas were generally misunderstood and distorted even by those who professed to be his disciples. He doubted he would be better understood in the future. He once said he felt as though he was writing for people who would think in a different way, breathe a different air of life, from that of present-day men.[32]

Contents

- 1Background

- 1.1The Wittgensteins

- 1.2Early life

- 1.3Family temperament and the brothers' suicides

- 21903–1906: Realschule in Linz

- 2.1Realschule in Linz

- 2.2Faith

- 2.3Influence of Otto Weininger

- 2.4Jewish background and Hitler

- 31906–1913: University

- 3.1Engineering at Berlin and Manchester

- 3.2Arrival at Cambridge

- 3.3Cambridge Moral Sciences Club and Apostles

- 3.4Cambridge Apostles

- 3.5Frustrations at Cambridge

- 3.6Sexual orientation and relationship with David Pinsent

- 41913–1920: World War I and the Tractatus

- 4.1Work on Logik

- 4.2Military service

- 4.3Completion of the Tractatus

- 51920–1928: Teaching, the Tractatus, Haus Wittgenstein

- 5.1Teacher training in Vienna

- 5.2Teaching posts in Austria

- 5.3Publication of the Tractatus

- 5.4Visit from Frank Ramsey, Puchberg

- 5.5Teaching continues, Otterthal; Haidbauer incident

- 5.6The Vienna Circle

- 5.7Haus Wittgenstein

- 61929–1941: Fellowship at Cambridge

- 6.1PhD and fellowship

- 6.2Anschluss

- 6.3Professor of philosophy

- 71941–1947: Guy's Hospital and Royal Victoria Infirmary

- 81947–1951: Final years

- 8.1Death

- 91953: Publication of the Philosophical Investigations

- 10Other posthumous publications

- 11Legacy

- 11.1Assessment

- 11.2Scholarly interpretation

- 11.2.1The New Wittgenstein

- 11.2.2Bertrand Russell

- 11.2.3Saul Kripke

- 12Works

- 13See also

- 14Footnotes

- 15References

- 16Sources

- 17Further reading

- 17.1Bergen and Cambridge archives

- 17.2Papers about his Nachlass

- 17.3Other

- 17.4Works referencing Wittgenstein

- 18External links

Background[edit]

The Wittgensteins[edit]

See also: Karl Wittgenstein

Further information: Wittgenstein family, Paul Wittgenstein, and Margaret Stonborough-Wittgenstein

Karl Wittgenstein was one of the richest men in Europe.[33]

According to a family tree prepared in Jerusalem after World War II, Wittgenstein's paternal great-great-grandfather was Moses Meier,[34] a Jewish land agent who lived with his wife, Brendel Simon, in Bad Laasphe in the Principality of Wittgenstein, Westphalia.[35] In July 1808, Napoleon issued a decree that everyone, including Jews, must adopt an inheritable family surname, so Meier's son, also Moses, took the name of his employers, the Sayn-Wittgensteins, and became Moses Meier Wittgenstein.[36] His son, Hermann Christian Wittgenstein — who took the middle name "Christian" to distance himself from his Jewish background — married Fanny Figdor, also Jewish, who converted to Protestantism just before they married, and the couple founded a successful business trading in wool in Leipzig.[37] Ludwig's grandmother Fanny was a first cousin of the violinist Joseph Joachim.[38]

They had 11 children – among them Wittgenstein's father. Karl Otto Clemens Wittgenstein (1847–1913) became an industrial tycoon, and by the late 1880s was one of the richest men in Europe, with an effective monopoly on Austria's steel cartel.[33][39] Thanks to Karl, the Wittgensteins became the second wealthiest family in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, only the Rothschilds being wealthier.[39] Karl Wittgenstein was viewed as the Austrian equivalent of Andrew Carnegie, with whom he was friends, and was one of the wealthiest men in the world by the 1890s.[33] As a result of his decision in 1898 to invest substantially in the Netherlands and in Switzerland as well as overseas, particularly in the US, the family was to an extent shielded from the hyperinflation that hit Austria in 1922.[40] However, their wealth diminished due to post-1918 hyperinflation and subsequently during the Great Depression, although even as late as 1938 they owned 13 mansions in Vienna alone.[41]

Early life[edit]

Palais Wittgenstein, the family home, around 1910

Wittgenstein's mother was Leopoldine Maria Josefa Kalmus, known among friends as Poldi. Her father was a Bohemian Jew and her mother was Austrian-Slovene Catholic – she was Wittgenstein's only non-Jewish grandparent.[42][43][44][45][46] She was an aunt of the Nobel Prize laureate Friedrich Hayek on her maternal side. Wittgenstein was born at 8:30 pm on 26 April 1889 in the "Villa Wittgenstein" at what is today Neuwaldegger Straße 38 in the suburban parish Neuwaldegg [de] next to Vienna.[47][48]

Ludwig, c. 1890s

Karl and Poldi had nine children in all – four girls: Hermine, Margaret (Gretl), Helene, and a fourth daughter Dora who died as a baby; and five boys: Johannes (Hans), Kurt, Rudolf (Rudi), Paul – who became a concert pianist despite losing an arm in World War I – and Ludwig, who was the youngest of the family.[49]

Ludwig sitting in a field as a child

The children were baptized as Catholics, received formal Catholic instruction, and were raised in an exceptionally intense environment.[50][page needed] The family was at the center of Vienna's cultural life; Bruno Walter described the life at the Wittgensteins' palace as an "all-pervading atmosphere of humanity and culture."[51] Karl was a leading patron of the arts, commissioning works by Auguste Rodin and financing the city's exhibition hall and art gallery, the Secession Building. Gustav Klimt painted Wittgenstein's sister for her wedding portrait, and Johannes Brahms and Gustav Mahler gave regular concerts in the family's numerous music rooms.[51][52]

Wittgenstein, who valued precision and discipline, never considered contemporary music acceptable. He said to his friend Drury in 1930:

Music came to a full stop with Brahms; and even in Brahms I can begin to hear the noise of machinery.[53]

Ludwig Wittgenstein himself had absolute pitch,[54] and his devotion to music remained vitally important to him throughout his life; he made frequent use of musical examples and metaphors in his philosophical writings, and he was unusually adept at whistling lengthy and detailed musical passages.[55] He also learnt to play the clarinet in his 30s.[56] A fragment of music (three bars), composed by Wittgenstein, was discovered in one of his 1931 notebooks, by Michael Nedo, director of the Wittgenstein Institute in Cambridge.[57]

Family temperament and the brothers' suicides[edit]

From left, Helene, Rudi, Hermine, Ludwig (the baby), Gretl, Paul, Hans, and Kurt, around 1890

Ray Monk writes that Karl's aim was to turn his sons into captains of industry; they were not sent to school lest they acquire bad habits, but were educated at home to prepare them for work in Karl's industrial empire.[58] Three of the five brothers would later commit suicide.[59][60] Psychiatrist Michael Fitzgerald argues that Karl was a harsh perfectionist who lacked empathy, and that Wittgenstein's mother was anxious and insecure, unable to stand up to her husband.[61] Johannes Brahms said of the family, whom he visited regularly:

They seemed to act towards one another as if they were at court.[39]

The family appeared to have a strong streak of depression running through it. Anthony Gottlieb tells a story about Paul practicing on one of the pianos in the Wittgensteins' main family mansion, when he suddenly shouted at Ludwig in the next room:

I cannot play when you are in the house, as I feel your scepticism seeping towards me from under the door![43]

Ludwig (bottom-right), Paul, and their sisters, late 1890s

The family palace housed seven grand pianos[62] and each of the siblings pursued music "with an enthusiasm that, at times, bordered on the pathological".[63] The eldest brother, Hans, was hailed as a musical prodigy. At the age of four, writes Alexander Waugh, Hans could identify the Doppler effect in a passing siren as a quarter-tone drop in pitch, and at five started crying "Wrong! Wrong!" when two brass bands in a carnival played the same tune in different keys. But he died in mysterious circumstances in May 1902, when he ran away to America and disappeared from a boat in Chesapeake Bay, most likely having committed suicide.[64][65]

Two years later, aged 22 and studying chemistry at the Berlin Academy, the third eldest brother, Rudi, committed suicide in a Berlin bar. He had asked the pianist to play Thomas Koschat's "Verlassen, verlassen, verlassen bin ich" ("Forsaken, forsaken, forsaken am I"), before mixing himself a drink of milk and potassium cyanide. He had left several suicide notes, one to his parents that said he was grieving over the death of a friend, and another that referred to his "perverted disposition". It was reported at the time that he had sought advice from the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee, an organization that was campaigning against Paragraph 175 of the German Criminal Code, which prohibited homosexual sex. His father forbade the family from ever mentioning his name again.[66][67][68][43]

The second eldest brother, Kurt, an officer and company director, shot himself on 27 October 1918 just before the end of World War I, when the Austrian troops he was commanding refused to obey his orders and deserted en masse.[58] According to Gottlieb, Hermine had said Kurt seemed to carry "the germ of disgust for life within himself".[69] Later, Ludwig wrote:

I ought to have ... become a star in the sky. Instead of which I have remained stuck on earth.[70]

1903–1906: Realschule in Linz[edit]

Realschule in Linz[edit]

The Realschule in Linz

Wittgenstein was taught by private tutors at home until he was 14 years old. Subsequently, for three years, he attended a school. After the deaths of Hans and Rudi, Karl relented, and allowed Paul and Ludwig to be sent to school. Waugh writes that it was too late for Wittgenstein to pass his exams for the more academic Gymnasium in Wiener Neustadt; having had no formal schooling, he failed his entrance exam and only barely managed after extra tutoring to pass the exam for the more technically oriented k.u.k. Realschule in Linz, a small state school with 300 pupils.[71][72][c] In 1903, when he was 14, he began his three years of formal schooling there, lodging nearby in term time with the family of Dr. Josef Strigl, a teacher at the local gymnasium, the family giving him the nickname Luki.[73][74]

On starting at the Realschule, Wittgenstein had been moved forward a year.[73] Historian Brigitte Hamann writes that he stood out from the other boys: he spoke an unusually pure form of High German with a stutter, dressed elegantly, and was sensitive and unsociable.[75] Monk writes that the other boys made fun of him, singing after him: "Wittgenstein wandelt wehmütig widriger Winde wegen Wienwärts"[56] ("Wittgenstein wanders wistfully Vienna-wards (in) worsening winds"). In his leaving certificate, he received a top mark (5) in religious studies; a 2 for conduct and English, 3 for French, geography, history, mathematics and physics, and 4 for German, chemistry, geometry and freehand drawing.[73] He had particular difficulty with spelling and failed his written German exam because of it. He wrote in 1931:

My bad spelling in youth, up to the age of about 18 or 19, is connected with the whole of the rest of my character (my weakness in study).[73]

Faith[edit]

Wittgenstein was baptized as an infant by a Catholic priest and received formal instruction in Catholic doctrine as a child, as was common at the time.[50][page needed] In an interview, his sister Gretl Stonborough-Wittgenstein says that their grandfather's "strong, severe, partly ascetic Christianity" was a strong influence on all the Wittgenstein children.[76] While he was at the Realschule, he decided he lacked religious faith and began reading Arthur Schopenhauer per Gretl's recommendation.[77] He nevertheless believed in the importance of the idea of confession. He wrote in his diaries about having made a major confession to his oldest sister, Hermine, while he was at the Realschule; Monk speculates that it may have been about his loss of faith. He also discussed it with Gretl, his other sister, who directed him to Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation.[77] As a teenager, Wittgenstein adopted Schopenhauer's epistemological idealism. However, after his study of the philosophy of mathematics, he abandoned epistemological idealism for Gottlob Frege's conceptual realism.[78] In later years, Wittgenstein was highly dismissive of Schopenhauer, describing him as an ultimately "shallow" thinker:

Schopenhauer has quite a crude mind ... where real depth starts, his comes to an end.[79]

Wittgenstein's relationship with Christianity and with religion in general, for which he always professed a sincere and devoted sympathy, would change over time, much like his philosophical ideas.[80] In 1912, Wittgenstein wrote to Russell saying that Mozart and Beethoven were the actual sons of God.[81] However, Wittgenstein resisted formal religion, saying it was hard for him to "bend the knee",[82] though his grandfather's beliefs continued to influence Wittgenstein – as he said, "I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view."[83] Wittgenstein referred to Augustine of Hippo in his Philosophical Investigations. Philosophically, Wittgenstein's thought shows alignment with religious discourse.[84] For example, he would become one of the century's fiercest critics of scientism.[85] Wittgenstein's religious belief emerged during his service for the Austrian army in World War I,[86] and he was a devoted reader of Dostoevsky's and Tolstoy's religious writings.[87] He viewed his wartime experiences as a trial in which he strove to conform to the will of God, and in a journal entry from 29 April 1915, he writes:

Perhaps the nearness of death will bring me the light of life. May God enlighten me. I am a worm, but through God I become a man. God be with me. Amen.[88]

Around this time, Wittgenstein wrote that "Christianity is indeed the only sure way to happiness", but he rejected the idea that religious belief was merely thinking that a certain doctrine was true.[89] From this time on, Wittgenstein viewed religious faith as a way of living and opposed rational argumentation or proofs for God. With age, a deepening personal spirituality led to several elucidations and clarifications, as he untangled language problems in religion—attacking, for example, the temptation to think of God's existence as a matter of scientific evidence.[90] In 1947, finding it more difficult to work, he wrote:

I have had a letter from an old friend in Austria, a priest. In it he says that he hopes my work will go well, if it should be God's will. Now that is all I want: if it should be God's will.[91]

In Culture and Value, Wittgenstein writes:

Is what I am doing [my work in philosophy] really worth the effort? Yes, but only if a light shines on it from above.

His close friend Norman Malcolm would write:

Wittgenstein's mature life was strongly marked by religious thought and feeling. I am inclined to think that he was more deeply religious than are many people who correctly regard themselves as religious believers.[50][page needed]

Toward the end, Wittgenstein wrote:

Bach wrote on the title page of his Orgelbüchlein, 'To the glory of the most high God, and that my neighbour may be benefited thereby.' That is what I would have liked to say about my work.[91]

Influence of Otto Weininger[edit]

Austrian philosopher Otto Weininger (1880–1903)

While a student at the Realschule, Wittgenstein was influenced by Austrian philosopher Otto Weininger's 1903 book Geschlecht und Charakter (Sex and Character).

Weininger (1880–1903), who was Jewish, argued that the concepts male and female exist only as Platonic forms, and that Jews tend to embody the Platonic femininity. Whereas men are basically rational, women operate only at the level of their emotions and sexual organs. Jews, Weininger argued, are similar, saturated with femininity, with no sense of right and wrong, and no soul. Weininger argues that man must choose between his masculine and feminine sides, consciousness and unconsciousness, Platonic love and sexuality. Love and sexual desire stand in contradiction, and love between a woman and a man is therefore doomed to misery or immorality. The only life worth living is the spiritual one – to live as a woman or a Jew means one has no right to live at all; the choice is genius or death. Weininger committed suicide, shooting himself in 1903, shortly after publishing the book.[92] Wittgenstein, then 14, attended Weininger's funeral.[93] Many years later, as a professor at the University of Cambridge, Wittgenstein distributed copies of Weininger's book to his bemused academic colleagues. He said that Weininger's arguments were wrong, but that it was the way they were wrong that was interesting.[94] In a letter dated 23 August 1931, Wittgenstein wrote the following to G. E. Moore:

Dear Moore,

Thanks for your letter. I can quite imagine that you don't admire Weininger very much, what with that beastly translation and the fact that W. must feel very foreign to you. It is true that he is fantastic but he is great and fantastic. It isn't necessary or rather not possible to agree with him but the greatness lies in that with which we disagree. It is his enormous mistake which is great. I.e. roughly speaking if you just add a "∼" to the whole book it says an important truth.[95]

In an unusual move, Wittgenstein took out a copy of Weininger's work on 1 June 1931 from the Special Order Books in the university library. He met Moore on 2 June, when he probably gave this copy to Moore.[95]

Jewish background and Hitler[edit]

Further information: History of the Jews in Austria

There is much debate about the extent to which Wittgenstein and his siblings, who were of 3/4 Jewish descent, saw themselves as Jews. The issue has arisen in particular regarding Wittgenstein's schooldays, because Adolf Hitler was, for a while, at the same school at the same time.[96] Laurence Goldstein argues that it is "overwhelmingly probable" that the boys met each other and that Hitler would have disliked Wittgenstein, a "stammering, precocious, precious, aristocratic upstart ..."[97][98] Other commentators have dismissed as irresponsible and uninformed any suggestion that Wittgenstein's wealth and unusual personality might have fed Hitler's antisemitism, in part because there is no indication that Hitler would have seen Wittgenstein as Jewish.[99][100]

Wittgenstein and Hitler were born just six days apart, though Hitler had to re-sit his mathematics exam before being allowed into a higher class, while Wittgenstein was moved forward by one, so they ended up two grades apart at the Realschule.[71][d] Monk estimates that they were both at the school during the 1904–1905 school year, but says there is no evidence they had anything to do with each other.[75][102][e] Several commentators have argued that a school photograph of Hitler may show Wittgenstein in the lower left corner,[75][107][g][h]

In his own writings[111] Wittgenstein frequently referred to himself as Jewish, at times as part of an apparent self-flagellation. For example, while berating himself for being a "reproductive" as opposed to "productive" thinker, he attributed this to his own Jewish sense of identity, writing:

The saint is the only Jewish "genius". Even the greatest Jewish thinker is no more than talented. (Myself for instance).[112]

While Wittgenstein would later claim that "[m]y thoughts are 100% Hebraic",[113] as Hans Sluga has argued, if so,

His was a self-doubting Judaism, which had always the possibility of collapsing into a destructive self-hatred (as it did in Weininger's case) but which also held an immense promise of innovation and genius.[114]

By Hebraic, he meant to include the Christian tradition, in contradistinction to the Greek tradition, holding that good and evil could not be reconciled.[115]

1906–1913: University[edit]

Engineering at Berlin and Manchester[edit]

Ludwig Wittgenstein, aged about eighteen

The old Technische Hochschule Berlin in Charlottenburg, Berlin

He began his studies in mechanical engineering at the Technische Hochschule Berlin in Charlottenburg, Berlin, on 23 October 1906, lodging with the family of professor Dr. Jolles. He attended for three semesters, and was awarded a diploma (Abgangzeugnis) on 5 May 1908.[116]

During his time at the Institute, Wittgenstein developed an interest in aeronautics.[117] He arrived at the Victoria University of Manchester in the spring of 1908 to study for a doctorate, full of plans for aeronautical projects, including designing and flying his own plane. He conducted research into the behavior of kites in the upper atmosphere, experimenting at a meteorological observation site near Glossop in Derbyshire.[118] Specifically, the Royal Meteorological Society researched and investigated the ionization of the upper atmosphere, by suspending instruments on balloons or kites. At Glossop, Wittgenstein worked under Professor of Physics Sir Arthur Schuster.[119]

He also worked on the design of a propeller with small jet engines on the end of its blades, something he patented in 1911, and which earned him a research studentship from the university in the autumn of 1908.[120] At the time, contemporary propeller designs were not advanced enough to actually put Wittgenstein's ideas into practice, and it would be years before a blade design that could support Wittgenstein's innovative design was created. Wittgenstein's design required air and gas to be forced along the propeller arms to combustion chambers on the end of each blade, where it was then compressed by the centrifugal force exerted by the revolving arms and ignited. Propellers of the time were typically wood, whereas modern blades are made from pressed steel laminates as separate halves, which are then welded together. This gives the blade a hollow interior, and thus creates an ideal pathway for the air and gas.[119]

Ludwig with his friend William Eccles at the Kite-Flying Station in Glossop, Derbyshire

Work on the jet-powered propeller proved frustrating for Wittgenstein, who had very little experience working with machinery.[121] Jim Bamber, a British engineer who was his friend and classmate at the time, reported that

when things went wrong, which often occurred, he would throw his arms around, stomp about, and swear volubly in German.[122]

According to William Eccles, another friend from that period, Wittgenstein then turned to more theoretical work, focusing on the design of the propeller – a problem that required relatively sophisticated mathematics.[121] It was at this time that he became interested in the foundations of mathematics, particularly after reading Bertrand Russell's The Principles of Mathematics (1903), and Gottlob Frege's The Foundations of Arithmetic, vol. 1 (1893) and vol. 2 (1903).[123] Wittgenstein's sister Hermine said he became obsessed with mathematics as a result, and was anyway losing interest in aeronautics.[124] He decided instead that he needed to study logic and the foundations of mathematics, describing himself as in a "constant, indescribable, almost pathological state of agitation."[124] In the summer of 1911 he visited Frege at the University of Jena to show him some philosophy of mathematics and logic he had written, and to ask whether it was worth pursuing.[125] He wrote:

I was shown into Frege's study. Frege was a small, neat man with a pointed beard who bounced around the room as he talked. He absolutely wiped the floor with me, and I felt very depressed; but at the end he said 'You must come again', so I cheered up. I had several discussions with him after that. Frege would never talk about anything but logic and mathematics, if I started on some other subject, he would say something polite and then plunge back into logic and mathematics.[126]

Arrival at Cambridge[edit]

Wittgenstein, 1910s

Wittgenstein wanted to study with Frege, but Frege suggested he attend the University of Cambridge to study under Russell, so on 18 October 1911 Wittgenstein arrived unannounced at Russell's rooms in Trinity College.[127] Russell was having tea with C. K. Ogden, when, according to Russell,

an unknown German appeared, speaking very little English but refusing to speak German. He turned out to be a man who had learned engineering at Charlottenburg, but during this course had acquired, by himself, a passion for the philosophy of mathematics & has now come to Cambridge on purpose to hear me.[125]

He was soon not only attending Russell's lectures, but dominating them. The lectures were poorly attended and Russell often found himself lecturing only to C. D. Broad, E. H. Neville, and H. T. J. Norton.[125] Wittgenstein started following him after lectures back to his rooms to discuss more philosophy, until it was time for the evening meal in Hall. Russell grew irritated; he wrote to his lover Lady Ottoline Morrell: "My German friend threatens to be an infliction."[128] Russell soon came to believe that Wittgenstein was a genius, especially after he had examined Wittgenstein's written work. He wrote in November 1911 that he had at first thought Wittgenstein might be a crank, but soon decided he was a genius:

Some of his early views made the decision difficult. He maintained, for example, at one time that all existential propositions are meaningless. This was in a lecture room, and I invited him to consider the proposition: 'There is no hippopotamus in this room at present.' When he refused to believe this, I looked under all the desks without finding one; but he remained unconvinced.[129]

Three months after Wittgenstein's arrival Russell told Morrell:

I love him & feel he will solve the problems I am too old to solve ... He is the young man one hopes for.[130]

Wittgenstein later told David Pinsent that Russell's encouragement had proven his salvation, and had ended nine years of loneliness and suffering, during which he had continually thought of suicide. In encouraging him to pursue philosophy and in justifying his inclination to abandon engineering, Russell had, quite literally, saved Wittgenstein's life.[130] The role-reversal between Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein was soon such that Russell wrote in 1916, after Wittgenstein had criticized Russell's own work:

His [Wittgenstein's] criticism, tho' I don't think you realized it at the time, was an event of first-rate importance in my life, and affected everything I have done since. I saw that he was right, and I saw that I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy.[131]

Cambridge Moral Sciences Club and Apostles[edit]

Bertrand Russell, 1907

In 1912 Wittgenstein joined the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club, an influential discussion group for philosophy dons and students, delivering his first paper there on 29 November that year, a four-minute talk defining philosophy as

all those primitive propositions which are assumed as true without proof by the various sciences.[132][133][134]

He dominated the society and for a time would stop attending in the early 1930s after complaints that he gave no one else a chance to speak.[135] The club became infamous within popular philosophy because of a meeting on 25 October 1946 at Richard Braithwaite's rooms in King's College, Cambridge, where Karl Popper, another Viennese philosopher, had been invited as the guest speaker. Popper's paper was "Are there philosophical problems?", in which he struck up a position against Wittgenstein's, contending that problems in philosophy are real, not just linguistic puzzles as Wittgenstein argued. Accounts vary as to what happened next, but Wittgenstein apparently started waving a hot poker, demanding that Popper give him an example of a moral rule. Popper offered one – "Not to threaten visiting speakers with pokers" – at which point Russell told Wittgenstein he had misunderstood and Wittgenstein left. Popper maintained that Wittgenstein "stormed out", but it had become accepted practice for him to leave early (because of his aforementioned ability to dominate discussion). It was the only time the philosophers, three of the most eminent in the world, were ever in the same room together.[136][137] The minutes record that the meeting was

charged to an unusual degree with a spirit of controversy.[138]

Cambridge Apostles[edit]

The economist John Maynard Keynes also invited him to join the Cambridge Apostles, an elite secret society formed in 1820, which both Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore had joined as students, but Wittgenstein did not greatly enjoy it and attended only infrequently. Russell had been worried that Wittgenstein would not appreciate the group's raucous style of intellectual debate, its precious sense of humour, and the fact that the members were often in love with one another.[139][failed verification] He was admitted in 1912 but resigned almost immediately because he could not tolerate the style of discussion. Nevertheless, the Cambridge Apostles allowed Wittgenstein to participate in meetings again in the 1920s when he had returned to Cambridge. Reportedly, Wittgenstein also had trouble tolerating the discussions in the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club.

Frustrations at Cambridge[edit]

Wittgenstein was quite vocal about his depression in his years at Cambridge, and before he went to war; on many an occasion, he told Russell of his woes. His mental anguish seemed to stem from two sources: his work, and his personal life. Wittgenstein made numerous remarks to Russell about logic driving him mad.[140] Wittgenstein also stated to Russell that he "felt the curse of those who have half a talent".[141] He later expresses this same worry, and tells of being in mediocre spirits due to his lack of progress in his logical work.[142] Monk writes that Wittgenstein lived and breathed logic, and a temporary lack of inspiration plunged him into despair.[143] Wittgenstein tells of his work in logic affecting his mental status in a very extreme way. However, he also tells Russell another story. Around Christmas, in 1913, he writes:

how can I be a logician before I'm a human being? For the most important thing is coming to terms with myself![144]

He also tells Russell on an occasion in Russell's rooms that he was worried about logic and his sins; also, once upon arrival to Russell's rooms one night Wittgenstein announced to Russell that he would kill himself once he left.[145] Of things Wittgenstein personally told Russell, Ludwig's temperament was also recorded in the diary of David Pinsent. Pinsent writes

I have to be frightfully careful and tolerant when he gets these sulky fits

and

I am afraid he is in an even more sensitive neurotic state just now than usual

when talking about Wittgenstein's emotional fluctuations.[146]

Sexual orientation and relationship with David Pinsent[edit]

Wittgenstein sitting with his friends and family in Vienna. Marguerite Respinger sits at the end of the left and the sculpture he made of her sits behind him on the mantel-place

Wittgenstein had romantic relations with both men and women. He is generally believed to have fallen in love with at least three men, and had a relationship with the latter two: David Hume Pinsent in 1912, Francis Skinner in 1930, and Ben Richards in the late 1940s.[147] He later revealed that, as a teenager in Vienna, he had had an affair with a woman.[148] Additionally, in the 1920s Wittgenstein fell in love with a young Swiss woman, Marguerite Respinger, sculpting a bust modelled on her and seriously considering marriage, albeit on condition that they would not have children; she decided that he was not right for her.[149]

David Pinsent

Wittgenstein's relationship with David Pinsent occurred during an intellectually formative period, and is well documented. Bertrand Russell introduced Wittgenstein to Pinsent in the summer of 1912. Pinsent was a mathematics undergraduate and a relation of David Hume, and Wittgenstein and he soon became very close.[150] The men worked together on experiments in the psychology laboratory about the role of rhythm in the appreciation of music, and Wittgenstein delivered a paper on the subject to the British Psychological Association in Cambridge in 1912. They also travelled together, including to Iceland in September 1912—the expenses paid by Wittgenstein, including first class travel, the hiring of a private train, and new clothes and spending money for Pinsent. In addition to Iceland, Wittgenstein and Pinsent traveled to Norway in 1913. In determining their destination, Wittgenstein and Pinsent visited a tourist office in search of a location that would fulfill the following criteria: a small village located on a fjord, a location away from tourists, and a peaceful destination to allow them to study logic and law.[151] Choosing Øystese, Wittgenstein and Pinsent arrived in the small village on 4 September 1913. During a vacation lasting almost three weeks, Wittgenstein was able to work vigorously on his studies. The immense progress on logic during their stay led Wittgenstein to express to Pinsent his notion of leaving Cambridge and returning to Norway to continue his work on logic.[152] Pinsent's diaries provide valuable insights into Wittgenstein's personality: sensitive, nervous, and attuned to the tiniest slight or change in mood from Pinsent.[153][154] Pinsent also writes of Wittgenstein being "absolutely sulky and snappish" at times, as well.[146] In his diaries Pinsent wrote about shopping for furniture with Wittgenstein in Cambridge when the latter was given rooms in Trinity. Most of what they found in the stores was not minimalist enough for Wittgenstein's aesthetics:

I went and helped him interview a lot of furniture at various shops ... It was rather amusing: He is terribly fastidious and we led the shopman a frightful dance, Vittgenstein [sic] ejaculating "No – Beastly!" to 90 percent of what he shewed us![155]

He wrote in May 1912 that Wittgenstein had just begun to study the history of philosophy:

He expresses the most naive surprise that all the philosophers he once worshipped in ignorance are after all stupid and dishonest and make disgusting mistakes![155]

The last time they saw each other was on 8 October 1913 at Lordswood House in Birmingham, then residence of the Pinsent family:

I got up at 6:15 to see Ludwig off. He had to go very early—back to Cambridge—as he has lots to do there. I saw him off from the house in a taxi at 7:00—to catch a 7:30 am train from New Street Station. It was sad parting from him.[154]

Wittgenstein left to live in Norway.

1913–1920: World War I and the Tractatus[edit]

Work on Logik[edit]

Entries from October 1914 in Wittgenstein's diary, on display at the Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge

Karl Wittgenstein died on 20 January 1913, and after receiving his inheritance Wittgenstein became one of the wealthiest men in Europe.[156] He donated some of his money, at first anonymously, to Austrian artists and writers, including Rainer Maria Rilke and Georg Trakl. Trakl requested to meet his benefactor but in 1914 when Wittgenstein went to visit, Trakl had killed himself. Wittgenstein came to feel that he could not get to the heart of his most fundamental questions while surrounded by other academics, and so in 1913 he retreated to the village of Skjolden in Norway, where he rented the second floor of a house for the winter.[157] He later saw this as one of the most productive periods of his life, writing Logik (Notes on Logic), the predecessor of much of the Tractatus.[127]

While in Norway, Wittgenstein learned Norwegian to converse with the local villagers, and Danish to read the works of the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard.[158] He adored the "quiet seriousness" of the landscape but even Skjolden became too busy for him. He soon designed a small wooden house which was erected on a remote rock overlooking the Eidsvatnet Lake just outside the village. The place was called "Østerrike" (Austria) by locals. He lived there during various periods until the 1930s, and substantial parts of his works were written there. (The house was broken up in 1958 to be rebuilt in the village. A local foundation collected donations and bought it in 2014; it was dismantled again and re-erected at its original location; the inauguration took place on 20 June 2019 with international attendance.)[157]

It was during this time that Wittgenstein began addressing what he considered to be a central issue in Notes on Logic, a general decision procedure for determining the truth value of logical propositions which would stem from a single primitive proposition. He became convinced during this time that

[a]ll the propositions of logic are generalizations of tautologies and all generalizations of tautologies are generalizations of logic. There are no other logical propositions.[159]

Based on this, Wittgenstein argued that propositions of logic express their truth or falsehood in the sign itself, and one need not know anything about the constituent parts of the proposition to determine it true or false. Rather, one simply need identify the statement as a tautology (true), a contradiction (false), or neither. The problem lay in forming a primitive proposition which encompassed this and would act as the basis for all of logic. As he stated in correspondence with Russell in late 1913,

The big question now is, how must a system of signs be constituted in order to make every tautology recognizable as such IN ONE AND THE SAME WAY? This is the fundamental problem of logic![142]

The importance Wittgenstein placed upon this fundamental problem was so great that he believed if he did not solve it, he had no reason or right to live.[160] Despite this apparent life-or-death importance, Wittgenstein had given up on this primitive proposition by the time of the writing of the Tractatus. The Tractatus does not offer any general process for identifying propositions as tautologies; in a simpler manner,

Every tautology itself shows that it is a tautology.[161]

This shift to understanding tautologies through mere identification or recognition occurred in 1914 when Moore was called on by Wittgenstein to assist him in dictating his notes. At Wittgenstein's insistence, Moore, who was now a Cambridge don, visited him in Norway in 1914, reluctantly because Wittgenstein exhausted him. David Edmonds and John Eidinow write that Wittgenstein regarded Moore, an internationally known philosopher, as an example of how far someone could get in life with "absolutely no intelligence whatever."[162] In Norway it was clear that Moore was expected to act as Wittgenstein's secretary, taking down his notes, with Wittgenstein falling into a rage when Moore got something wrong.[163] When he returned to Cambridge, Moore asked the university to consider accepting Logik as sufficient for a bachelor's degree, but they refused, saying it wasn't formatted properly: no footnotes, no preface. Wittgenstein was furious, writing to Moore in May 1914:

If I am not worth your making an exception for me even in some STUPID details then I may as well go to Hell directly; and if I am worth it and you don't do it then – by God – you might go there.[164]

Moore was apparently distraught; he wrote in his diary that he felt sick and could not get the letter out of his head.[165] The two did not speak again until 1929.[163]

Military service[edit]

Austro-Hungarian supply line over the Vršič Pass, on the Italian front, October 1917

On the outbreak of World War I, Wittgenstein immediately volunteered for the Austro-Hungarian Army, despite being eligible for a medical exemption.[166][167] He served first on a ship and then in an artillery workshop "several miles from the action".[166] He was wounded in an accidental explosion, and hospitalised to Kraków.[166] In March 1916, he was posted to a fighting unit on the front line of the Russian front, as part of the Austrian 7th Army, where his unit was involved in some of the heaviest fighting, defending against the Brusilov Offensive.[168] Wittgenstein directed the fire of his own artillery from an observation post in no-man's land against Allied troops—one of the most dangerous jobs, since he was targeted by enemy fire.[167] He was decorated with the Military Merit with Swords on the Ribbon, and was commended by the army for "exceptionally courageous behaviour, calmness, sang-froid, and heroism" that "won the total admiration of the troops".[169] In January 1917, he was sent as a member of a howitzer regiment to the Russian front, where he won several more medals for bravery including the Silver Medal for Valour, First Class.[170] In 1918, he was promoted to lieutenant and sent to the Italian front as part of an artillery regiment. For his part in the final Austrian offensive of June 1918, he was recommended for the Gold Medal for Valour, one of the highest honours in the Austrian army, but was instead awarded the Band of the Military Service Medal with Swords—it being decided that this particular action, although extraordinarily brave, had been insufficiently consequential to merit the highest honour.[171]

Wittgenstein's military identity card during the First World War

Throughout the war, he kept notebooks in which he frequently wrote philosophical reflections alongside personal remarks, including his contempt for the character of the other soldiers.[172] His notebooks also attest to his philosophical and spiritual reflections, and it was during this time that he experienced a kind of religious awakening.[86] In his entry from 11 June 1915, Wittgenstein states that

The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.

And connect with this the comparison of God to a father.

To pray is to think about the meaning of life.[173]

and on 8 July that

To believe in God means to understand the meaning of life.

To believe in God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter.

To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning [ ... ]

When my conscience upsets my equilibrium, then I am not in agreement with Something. But what is this? Is it the world?

Certainly it is correct to say: Conscience is the voice of God.[174]

He discovered Leo Tolstoy's 1896 The Gospel in Brief at a bookshop in Tarnów, and carried it everywhere, recommending it to anyone in distress, to the point where he became known to his fellow soldiers as "the man with the gospels".[175][176]

The extent to which The Gospel in Brief influenced Wittgenstein can be seen in the Tractatus, in the unique way both books number their sentences.[177] In 1916 Wittgenstein read Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov so often that he knew whole passages of it by heart, particularly the speeches of the elder Zosima, who represented for him a powerful Christian ideal, a holy man "who could see directly into the souls of other people".[87][178]

Iain King has suggested that Wittgenstein's writing changed substantially in 1916, when he started confronting much greater dangers during frontline fighting.[179] Russell said he returned from the war a changed man, one with a deeply mystical and ascetic attitude.[180]

Completion of the Tractatus[edit]

The Wittgenstein family in Vienna, Summer 1917, with Kurt (furthest left) and Ludwig (furthest right) in officers' uniforms.

In the summer of 1918 Wittgenstein took military leave and went to stay in one of his family's Vienna summer houses, Neuwaldegg. It was there in August 1918 that he completed the Tractatus, which he submitted with the title Der Satz (German: proposition, sentence, phrase, set, but also "leap") to the publishers Jahoda and Siegel.[181]

A series of events around this time left him deeply upset. On 13 August, his uncle Paul died. On 25 October, he learned that Jahoda and Siegel had decided not to publish the Tractatus, and on 27 October, his brother Kurt killed himself, the third of his brothers to commit suicide. It was around this time he received a letter from David Pinsent's mother to say that Pinsent had been killed in a plane crash on 8 May.[182][183] Wittgenstein was distraught to the point of being suicidal. He was sent back to the Italian front after his leave and, as a result of the defeat of the Austrian army, he was captured by Allied forces on 3 November in Trentino. He subsequently spent nine months in an Italian prisoner of war camp.

He returned to his family in Vienna on 25 August 1919, by all accounts physically and mentally spent. He apparently talked incessantly about suicide, terrifying his sisters and brother Paul. He decided to do two things: to enroll in teacher training college as an elementary school teacher, and to get rid of his fortune. In 1914, it had been providing him with an income of 300,000 Kronen a year, but by 1919 was worth a great deal more, with a sizable portfolio of investments in the United States and the Netherlands. He divided it among his siblings, except for Margarete, insisting that it not be held in trust for him. His family saw him as ill, and acquiesced.[181]

1920–1928: Teaching, the Tractatus, Haus Wittgenstein[edit]

Teacher training in Vienna[edit]

In September 1919 he enrolled in the Lehrerbildungsanstalt (teacher training college) in the Kundmanngasse in Vienna. His sister Hermine said that Wittgenstein working as an elementary teacher was like using a precision instrument to open crates, but the family decided not to interfere.[184] Thomas Bernhard, more critically, wrote of this period in Wittgenstein's life: "the multi-millionaire as a village schoolmaster is surely a piece of perversity."[185]

Teaching posts in Austria[edit]

In the summer of 1920, Wittgenstein worked as a gardener for a monastery. At first he applied, under a false name, for a teaching post at Reichenau, was awarded the job, but he declined it when his identity was discovered. As a teacher, he wished to no longer be recognized as a member of the Wittgenstein family. In response, his brother Paul wrote:

It is out of the question, really completely out of the question, that anybody bearing our name and whose elegant and gentle upbringing can be seen a thousand paces off, would not be identified as a member of our family ... That one can neither simulate nor dissimulate anything including a refined education I need hardly tell you.[186]

In 1920, Wittgenstein was given his first job as a primary school teacher in Trattenbach, under his real name, in a remote village of a few hundred people. His first letters describe it as beautiful, but in October 1921, he wrote to Russell: "I am still at Trattenbach, surrounded, as ever, by odiousness and baseness. I know that human beings on the average are not worth much anywhere, but here they are much more good-for-nothing and irresponsible than elsewhere."[187] He was soon the object of gossip among the villagers, who found him eccentric at best. He did not get on well with the other teachers; when he found his lodgings too noisy, he made a bed for himself in the school kitchen. He was an enthusiastic teacher, offering late-night extra tuition to several of the students, something that did not endear him to the parents, though some of them came to adore him; his sister Hermine occasionally watched him teach and said the students "literally crawled over each other in their desire to be chosen for answers or demonstrations."[188]

To the less able, it seems that he became something of a tyrant. The first two hours of each day were devoted to mathematics, hours that Monk writes some of the pupils recalled years later with horror.[189] They reported that he caned the boys and boxed their ears, and also that he pulled the girls' hair;[190] this was not unusual at the time for boys, but for the villagers he went too far in doing it to the girls too; girls were not expected to understand algebra, much less have their ears boxed over it. The violence apart, Monk writes that he quickly became a village legend, shouting "Krautsalat!" ("coleslaw" – i.e. shredded cabbage) when the headmaster played the piano, and "Nonsense!" when a priest was answering children's questions.[191]

Publication of the Tractatus[edit]

Ludwig Wittgenstein, schoolteacher, c. 1922

While Wittgenstein was living in isolation in rural Austria, the Tractatus was published to considerable interest, first in German in 1921 as Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung, part of Wilhelm Ostwald's journal Annalen der Naturphilosophie, though Wittgenstein was not happy with the result and called it a pirate edition. Russell had agreed to write an introduction to explain why it was important, because it was otherwise unlikely to have been published: it was difficult if not impossible to understand, and Wittgenstein was unknown in philosophy.[192] In a letter to Russell, Wittgenstein wrote "The main point is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by prop[osition]s – i.e. by language – (and, which comes to the same thing, what can be thought) and what can not be expressed by pro[position]s, but only shown (gezeigt); which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy."[193] But Wittgenstein was not happy with Russell's help. He had lost faith in Russell, finding him glib and his philosophy mechanistic, and felt he had fundamentally misunderstood the Tractatus.[194]

The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena. Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages. And in fact both were right and both wrong; though the view of the ancients is clearer insofar as they have an acknowledged terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if everything were explained.

— Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.371-2

An English translation was prepared in Cambridge by Frank Ramsey, a mathematics undergraduate at King's commissioned by C. K. Ogden. It was Moore who suggested Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus for the title, an allusion to Baruch Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Initially there were difficulties in finding a publisher for the English edition too, because Wittgenstein was insisting it appear without Russell's introduction; Cambridge University Press turned it down for that reason. Finally in 1922 an agreement was reached with Wittgenstein that Kegan Paul would print a bilingual edition with Russell's introduction and the Ramsey-Ogden translation.[195] This is the translation that was approved by Wittgenstein, but it is problematic in a number of ways. Wittgenstein's English was poor at the time, and Ramsey was a teenager who had only recently learned German, so philosophers often prefer to use a 1961 translation by David Pears and Brian McGuinness.[i]

An aim of the Tractatus is to reveal the relationship between language and the world: what can be said about it, and what can only be shown. Wittgenstein argues that the logical structure of language provides the limits of meaning. The limits of language, for Wittgenstein, are the limits of philosophy. Much of philosophy involves attempts to say the unsayable: "What we can say at all can be said clearly," he argues. Anything beyond that – religion, ethics, aesthetics, the mystical – cannot be discussed. They are not in themselves nonsensical, but any statement about them must be.[197] He wrote in the preface: "The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather – not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought)."[198]

The book is 75 pages long – "As to the shortness of the book, I am awfully sorry for it ... If you were to squeeze me like a lemon you would get nothing more out of me," he told Ogden – and presents seven numbered propositions (1–7), with various sub-levels (1, 1.1, 1.11):[199]

1. Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist.

The world is everything that is the case.[200]

2. Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.

What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.

3. Das logische Bild der Tatsachen ist der Gedanke.

The logical picture of the facts is the thought.

4. Der Gedanke ist der sinnvolle Satz.

The thought is the significant proposition.

5. Der Satz ist eine Wahrheitsfunktion der Elementarsätze.

Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.

6. Die allgemeine Form der Wahrheitsfunktion ist:

[\bar p,\bar\xi, N(\bar\xi)]. Dies ist die allgemeine Form des Satzes.

[\bar p,\bar\xi, N(\bar\xi)]. This is the general form of proposition.

7. Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

Visit from Frank Ramsey, Puchberg[edit]

Frank P. Ramsey visited Wittgenstein in Puchberg am Schneeberg in September 1923.

In September 1922 he moved to a secondary school in a nearby village, Hassbach, but considered the people there just as bad – "These people are not human at all but loathsome worms," he wrote to a friend – and he left after a month. In November he began work at another primary school, this time in Puchberg in the Schneeberg mountains. There, he told Russell, the villagers were "one-quarter animal and three-quarters human."

Frank P. Ramsey visited him on 17 September 1923 to discuss the Tractatus; he had agreed to write a review of it for Mind.[201] He reported in a letter home that Wittgenstein was living frugally in one tiny whitewashed room that only had space for a bed, a washstand, a small table, and one small hard chair. Ramsey shared an evening meal with him of coarse bread, butter, and cocoa. Wittgenstein's school hours were eight to twelve or one, and he had afternoons free.[202] After Ramsey returned to Cambridge a long campaign began among Wittgenstein's friends to persuade him to return to Cambridge and away from what they saw as a hostile environment for him. He was accepting no help even from his family.[203] Ramsey wrote to John Maynard Keynes:

[Wittgenstein's family] are very rich and extremely anxious to give him money or do anything for him in any way, and he rejects all their advances; even Christmas presents or presents of invalid's food, when he is ill, he sends back. And this is not because they aren't on good terms but because he won't have any money he hasn't earned ... It is an awful pity.[203]

Teaching continues, Otterthal; Haidbauer incident[edit]

Main article: Haidbauer incident

Wittgenstein, 1925

He moved schools again in September 1924, this time to Otterthal, near Trattenbach; the socialist headmaster, Josef Putre, was someone Wittgenstein had become friends with while at Trattenbach. While he was there, he wrote a 42-page pronunciation and spelling dictionary for the children, Wörterbuch für Volksschulen, published in Vienna in 1926 by Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, the only book of his apart from the Tractatus that was published in his lifetime.[195] A first edition sold in 2005 for £75,000.[204] In 2020, an English version entitled Word Book translated by art historian Bettina Funcke and illustrated by artist / publisher Paul Chan was released.[205]

An incident occurred in April 1926 and became known as Der Vorfall Haidbauer (the Haidbauer incident). Josef Haidbauer was an 11-year-old pupil whose father had died and whose mother worked as a local maid. He was a slow learner, and one day Wittgenstein hit him two or three times on the head, causing him to collapse. Wittgenstein carried him to the headmaster's office, then quickly left the school, bumping into a parent, Herr Piribauer, on the way out. Piribauer had been sent for by the children when they saw Haidbauer collapse; Wittgenstein had previously pulled Piribauer's daughter, Hermine, so hard by the ears that her ears had bled.[206] Piribauer said that when he met Wittgenstein in the hall that day:

I called him all the names under the sun. I told him he wasn't a teacher, he was an animal-trainer! And that I was going to fetch the police right away![207]

Piribauer tried to have Wittgenstein arrested, but the village's police station was empty, and when he tried again the next day he was told Wittgenstein had disappeared. On 28 April 1926, Wittgenstein handed in his resignation to Wilhelm Kundt, a local school inspector, who tried to persuade him to stay; however, Wittgenstein was adamant that his days as a schoolteacher were over.[207] Proceedings were initiated in May, and the judge ordered a psychiatric report; in August 1926 a letter to Wittgenstein from a friend, Ludwig Hänsel, indicates that hearings were ongoing, but nothing is known about the case after that. Alexander Waugh writes that Wittgenstein's family and their money may have had a hand in covering things up. Waugh writes that Haidbauer died shortly afterwards of haemophilia; Monk says he died when he was 14 of leukaemia.[208][209] Ten years later, in 1936, as part of a series of "confessions" he engaged in that year, Wittgenstein appeared without warning at the village saying he wanted to confess personally and ask for pardon from the children he had hit. He visited at least four of the children, including Hermine Piribauer, who apparently replied only with a "Ja, ja," though other former students were more hospitable. Monk writes that the purpose of these confessions was not

to hurt his pride, as a form of punishment; it was to dismantle it – to remove a barrier, as it were, that stood in the way of honest and decent thought.

Of the apologies, Wittgenstein wrote,

This brought me into more settled waters... and to greater seriousness.[210]

The Vienna Circle[edit]

See also: Vienna Circle

The Tractatus was now the subject of much debate amongst philosophers, and Wittgenstein was a figure of increasing international fame. In particular, a discussion group of philosophers, scientists and mathematicians, known as the Vienna Circle, had built up purportedly as a result of the inspiration they had been given by reading the Tractatus.[203] While it is commonly assumed that Wittgenstein was a part of the Vienna Circle, in reality, this was not actually the case. German philosopher Oswald Hanfling writes bluntly: "Wittgenstein was never a member of the Circle, though he was in Vienna during much of the time.

Yet his influence on the Circle's thought was at least as important as that of any of its members."[211] However, the philosopher A. C. Grayling contends that while certain superficial similarities between Wittgenstein's early philosophy and logical positivism led its members to study the Tractatus in detail and to arrange discussions with him, Wittgenstein's influence on the Circle was rather limited. The fundamental philosophical views of Circle had been established before they met Wittgenstein and had their origins in the British empiricists, Ernst Mach, and the logic of Frege and Russell. Whatever influence Wittgenstein did have on the Circle was largely limited to Moritz Schlick and Friedrich Waismann and, even in these cases, resulted in little lasting effect on their positivism. Grayling states: "...it is no longer possible to think of the Tractatus as having inspired a philosophical movement, as most earlier commentators claimed."[212]

From 1926, with the members of the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein would take part in many discussions. However, during these discussions, it soon became evident that Wittgenstein held a different attitude towards philosophy than the members of the Circle. For example, during meetings of the Vienna Circle, he would express his disagreement with the group's misreading of his work by turning his back to them and reading poetry aloud.[213] In his autobiography, Rudolf Carnap describes Wittgenstein as the thinker who gave him the greatest inspiration. However, he also wrote that "there was a striking difference between Wittgenstein's attitude toward philosophical problems and that of Schlick and myself. Our attitude toward philosophical problems was not very different from that which scientists have toward their problems." As for Wittgenstein:

His point of view and his attitude toward people and problems, even theoretical problems, were much more similar to those of a creative artist than to those of a scientist; one might almost say, similar to those of a religious prophet or a seer... When finally, sometimes after a prolonged arduous effort, his answers came forth, his statement stood before us like a newly created piece of art or a divine revelation ... the impression he made on us was as if insight came to him as through divine inspiration, so that we could not help feeling that any sober rational comment or analysis of it would be a profanation.[214]

Haus Wittgenstein[edit]

Main article: Haus Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein worked on Haus Wittgenstein between 1926 and 1929.

I am not interested in erecting a building, but in [...] presenting to myself the foundations of all possible buildings.

— Wittgenstein[215]

In 1926 Wittgenstein was again working as a gardener for a number of months, this time at the monastery of Hütteldorf, where he had also inquired about becoming a monk. His sister, Margaret, invited him to help with the design of her new townhouse in Vienna's Kundmanngasse. Wittgenstein, his friend Paul Engelmann, and a team of architects developed a spare modernist house. In particular, Wittgenstein focused on the windows, doors, and radiators, demanding that every detail be exactly as he specified. When the house was nearly finished Wittgenstein had an entire ceiling raised 30 mm so that the room had the exact proportions he wanted. Monk writes that "This is not so marginal as it may at first appear, for it is precisely these details that lend what is otherwise a rather plain, even ugly house its distinctive beauty."[216]

It took him a year to design the door handles and another to design the radiators. Each window was covered by a metal screen that weighed 150 kilograms (330 lb), moved by a pulley Wittgenstein designed. Bernhard Leitner, author of The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein, said there is barely anything comparable in the history of interior design: "It is as ingenious as it is expensive. A metal curtain that could be lowered into the floor."[216]

The house was finished by December 1928 and the family gathered there at Christmas to celebrate its completion. Wittgenstein's sister Hermine wrote: "Even though I admired the house very much. ... It seemed indeed to be much more a dwelling for the gods."[215] Wittgenstein said "the house I built for Gretl is the product of a decidedly sensitive ear and good manners, and expression of great understanding... But primordial life, wild life striving to erupt into the open – that is lacking."[217] Monk comments that the same might be said of the technically excellent, but austere, terracotta sculpture Wittgenstein had modelled of Marguerite Respinger in 1926, and that, as Russell first noticed, this "wild life striving to be in the open" was precisely the substance of Wittgenstein's philosophical work.[217]

1929–1941: Fellowship at Cambridge[edit]

PhD and fellowship[edit]

Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1930

According to Feigl (as reported by Monk), upon attending a conference in Vienna by mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer, Wittgenstein remained quite impressed, taking into consideration the possibility of a "return to Philosophy". At the urging of Ramsey and others, Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929. Keynes wrote in a letter to his wife: "Well, God has arrived. I met him on the 5.15 train."[218][219][220][221] Despite this fame, he could not initially work at Cambridge as he did not have a degree, so he applied as an advanced undergraduate. Russell noted that his previous residency was sufficient to fulfil eligibility requirements for a PhD, and urged him to offer the Tractatus as his thesis.[222] It was examined in 1929 by Russell and Moore; at the end of the thesis defence, Wittgenstein clapped the two examiners on the shoulder and said, '"Don't worry, I know you'll never understand it."[223] Moore wrote in the examiner's report: "I myself consider that this is a work of genius; but, even if I am completely mistaken and it is nothing of the sort, it is well above the standard required for the Ph.D. degree."[224] Wittgenstein was appointed as a lecturer and was made a fellow of Trinity College.

Anschluss[edit]

Further information: Anschluss, Nuremberg Laws, and Mischling Test

Photograph showing Wittgenstein's house in Norway, sent by Wittgenstein to G. E. Moore, October 1936

From 1936 to 1937, Wittgenstein lived again in Norway,[225] where he worked on the Philosophical Investigations. In the winter of 1936/7, he delivered a series of "confessions" to close friends, most of them about minor infractions like white lies, in an effort to cleanse himself. In 1938, he travelled to Ireland to visit Maurice O'Connor Drury, a friend who became a psychiatrist, and considered such training himself, with the intention of abandoning philosophy for it. The visit to Ireland was at the same time a response to the invitation of the then Irish Taoiseach, Éamon de Valera, himself a former mathematics teacher. De Valera hoped Wittgenstein's presence would contribute to the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies which he was soon to set up.[226]

Wittgenstein on holiday in France with Gilbert Pattisson, July 1936

While he was in Ireland in March 1938, Germany annexed Austria in the Anschluss; the Viennese Wittgenstein was now a Jew under the 1935 Nuremberg racial laws, because three of his grandparents had been born as Jews. He would also, in July, become by law a citizen of the enlarged Germany.[1]

The Nuremberg Laws classified people as Jews (Volljuden) if they had three or four Jewish grandparents, and as mixed blood (Mischling) if they had one or two. It meant inter alia that the Wittgensteins were restricted in whom they could marry or have sex with, and where they could work.[227]

After the Anschluss, his brother Paul left almost immediately for England, and later the US. The Nazis discovered his relationship with Hilde Schania, a brewer's daughter with whom he had had two children but whom he had never married, though he did later. Because she was not Jewish, he was served with a summons for Rassenschande (racial defilement). He told no one he was leaving the country, except for Hilde who agreed to follow him. He left so suddenly and quietly that for a time people believed he was the fourth Wittgenstein brother to have committed suicide.[228]

Wittgenstein began to investigate acquiring British or Irish citizenship with the help of Keynes, and apparently had to confess to his friends in England that he had earlier misrepresented himself to them as having just one Jewish grandparent, when in fact he had three.[229]

A few days before the invasion of Poland, Hitler personally granted Mischling status to the Wittgenstein siblings. In 1939 there were 2,100 applications for this, and Hitler granted only 12.[230] Anthony Gottlieb writes that the pretext was that their paternal grandfather had been the bastard son of a German prince, which allowed the Reichsbank to claim foreign currency, stocks and 1700 kg of gold held in Switzerland by a Wittgenstein family trust. Gretl, an American citizen by marriage, started the negotiations over the racial status of their grandfather, and the family's large foreign currency reserves were used as a bargaining tool. Paul had escaped to Switzerland and then the US in July 1938, and disagreed with the negotiations, leading to a permanent split between the siblings. After the war, when Paul was performing in Vienna, he did not visit Hermine who was dying there, and he had no further contact with Ludwig or Gretl.[43]

Professor of philosophy[edit]

Wittgenstein in the Fellows' Garden at Trinity, 1939

After G.E. Moore resigned the chair in philosophy in 1939, Wittgenstein was elected. He was naturalised as a British subject shortly after on 12 April 1939.[231] In July 1939 he travelled to Vienna to assist Gretl and his other sisters, visiting Berlin for one day to meet an official of the Reichsbank. After this, he travelled to New York to persuade Paul, whose agreement was required, to back the scheme. The required Befreiung was granted in August 1939. The unknown amount signed over to the Nazis by the Wittgenstein family, a week or so before the outbreak of war, included amongst many other assets 1,700 kg of gold.[232] There is a report Wittgenstein visited Moscow a second time in 1939, travelling from Berlin, and again met the philosopher Sophia Janowskaya.[233]

Norman Malcolm, at the time a post-graduate research fellow at Cambridge, describes his first impressions of Wittgenstein in 1938:

At a meeting of the Moral Science Club, after the paper for the evening was read and the discussion started, someone began to stammer a remark. He had extreme difficulty in expressing himself and his words were unintelligible to me. I whispered to my neighbour, 'Who's that?': he replied, 'Wittgenstein'. I was astonished because I had expected the famous author of the Tractatus to be an elderly man, whereas this man looked young – perhaps about 35. (His actual age was 49.) His face was lean and brown, his profile was aquiline and strikingly beautiful, his head was covered with a curly mass of brown hair. I observed the respectful attention that everyone in the room paid to him. After this unsuccessful beginning he did not speak for a time but was obviously struggling with his thoughts. His look was concentrated, he made striking gestures with his hands as if he was discoursing ... Whether lecturing or conversing privately, Wittgenstein always spoke emphatically and with a distinctive intonation. He spoke excellent English, with the accent of an educated Englishman, although occasional Germanisms would appear in his constructions. His voice was resonant ... His words came out, not fluently, but with great force. Anyone who heard him say anything knew that this was a singular person. His face was remarkably mobile and expressive when he talked. His eyes were deep and often fierce in their expression. His whole personality was commanding, even imperial.[234]

Describing Wittgenstein's lecture programme, Malcolm continues:

It is hardly correct to speak of these meetings as 'lectures', although this is what Wittgenstein called them. For one thing, he was carrying on original research in these meetings ... Often the meetings consisted mainly of dialogue. Sometimes, however, when he was trying to draw a thought out of himself, he would prohibit, with a peremptory motion of the hand, any questions or remarks. There were frequent and prolonged periods of silence, with only an occasional mutter from Wittgenstein, and the stillest attention from the others. During these silences, Wittgenstein was extremely tense and active. His gaze was concentrated; his face was alive; his hands made arresting movements; his expression was stern. One knew that one was in the presence of extreme seriousness, absorption, and force of intellect ... Wittgenstein was a frightening person at these classes.[235]

After work, the philosopher would often relax by watching Westerns, where he preferred to sit at the very front of the cinema, or reading detective stories especially the ones written by Norbert Davis.[236][237] Norman Malcolm wrote that Wittgenstein would rush to the cinema when class ended.[238]

By this time, Wittgenstein's view on the foundations of mathematics had changed considerably. In his early 20s, Wittgenstein had thought logic could provide a solid foundation, and he had even considered updating Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica. Now he denied there were any mathematical facts to be discovered. He gave a series of lectures on mathematics, discussing this and other topics, documented in a book, with lectures by Wittgenstein and discussions between him and several students, including the young Alan Turing who described Wittgenstein as "a very peculiar man". The two had many discussions about the relationship between computational logic and everyday notions of truth.[239][240]

Wittgenstein's lectures from this period have also been discussed by another of his students, the Greek philosopher and educator Helle Lambridis. Wittgenstein's teachings in the years 1940–1941 are used in the mid-1950s by Lambridis to write a long text in the form of an imagined dialogue with him, where she begins to develop her own ideas about resemblance in relation to language, elementary concepts and basic-level mental images. Initially only a part of it was published in 1963 in the German education theory review Club Voltaire, but the entire imagined dialogue with Wittgenstein was published after Lambridis's death by her archive holder, the Academy of Athens, in 2004.[241][242]

1941–1947: Guy's Hospital and Royal Victoria Infirmary[edit]

Wittgenstein in Swansea, Summer 1947

Monk writes that Wittgenstein found it intolerable that a war (World War II) was going on and he was teaching philosophy. He grew angry when any of his students wanted to become professional philosophers.[j]

In September 1941, he asked John Ryle, the brother of the philosopher Gilbert Ryle, if he could get a manual job at Guy's Hospital in London. John Ryle was professor of medicine at Cambridge and had been involved in helping Guy's prepare for the Blitz. Wittgenstein told Ryle he would die slowly if left at Cambridge, and he would rather die quickly. He started working at Guy's shortly afterwards as a dispensary porter, delivering drugs from the pharmacy to the wards where he apparently advised the patients not to take them.[243] In the new year of 1942, Ryle took Wittgenstein to his home in Sussex to meet his wife who had been determined to meet him. His son recorded the weekend in his diary;

Wink is awful strange [sic] – not a very good english speaker, keeps on saying 'I mean' and 'its "tolerable"' meaning intolerable.[244]

The hospital staff were not told he was one of the world's most famous philosophers, though some of the medical staff did recognize him – at least one had attended Moral Sciences Club meetings – but they were discreet. "Good God, don't tell anybody who I am!" Wittgenstein begged one of them.[245] Some of them nevertheless called him Professor Wittgenstein, and he was allowed to dine with the doctors. He wrote on 1 April 1942: "I no longer feel any hope for the future of my life. It is as though I had before me nothing more than a long stretch of living death. I cannot imagine any future for me other than a ghastly one. Friendless and joyless."[243] It was at this time that Wittgenstein had an operation at Guy's to remove a gallstone that had troubled him for some years.[246]

He had developed a friendship with Keith Kirk, a working-class teenage friend of Francis Skinner, the mathematics undergraduate he had had a relationship with until Skinner's death in 1941 from polio. Skinner had given up academia, thanks at least in part to Wittgenstein's influence, and had been working as a mechanic in 1939, with Kirk as his apprentice. Kirk and Wittgenstein struck up a friendship, with Wittgenstein giving him lessons in physics to help him pass a City and Guilds exam. During his period of loneliness at Guy's he wrote in his diary: "For ten days I've heard nothing more from K, even though I pressed him a week ago for news. I think that he has perhaps broken with me. A tragic thought!"[247] Kirk had in fact got married, and they never saw one another again.[248]

While Wittgenstein was at Guy's he met Basil Reeve, a young doctor with an interest in philosophy, who, with R. T. Grant,[249] was studying the effect of wound shock[250] (a state associative to hypovolaemia[251]) on air-raid casualties. When the Blitz ended there were fewer casualties to study. In November 1942, Grant and Reeve moved to the Royal Victoria Infirmary, Newcastle upon Tyne, to study road traffic and industrial casualties. Grant offered Wittgenstein a position as a laboratory assistant at a wage of £4 per week, and he lived in Newcastle (at 28 Brandling Park, Jesmond[249]) from 29 April 1943 until February 1944.[252] While there he worked [253][254] and associated socially with Dr Erasmus Barlow,[254] a great-grandson of Charles Darwin.[255]

In the summer of 1946, Wittgenstein thought often of leaving Cambridge and resigning his position as Chair. Wittgenstein grew further dismayed at the state of philosophy, particularly about articles published in the journal Mind. It was around this time that Wittgenstein fell in love with Ben Richards, writing in his diary, "The only thing that my love for B. has done for me is this: it has driven the other small worries associated with my position and my work into the background." On 30 September, Wittgenstein wrote about Cambridge after his return from Swansea, "Everything about the place repels me. The stiffness, the artificiality, the self-satisfaction of the people. The university atmosphere nauseates me."[256]

Wittgenstein had only maintained contact with Fouracre, from Guy's hospital, who had joined the army in 1943 after his marriage, only returning in 1947. Wittgenstein maintained frequent correspondence with Fouracre during his time away displaying a desire for Fouracre to return home urgently from the war.[256]

In May 1947, Wittgenstein addressed a group of Oxford philosophers for the first time at the Jowett Society. The discussion was on the validity of Descartes' Cogito ergo sum, where Wittgenstein ignored the question and applied his own philosophical method. Harold Arthur Prichard who attended the event was not pleased with Wittgenstein's methods;

Wittgenstein: If a man says to me, looking at the sky, 'I think it will rain, therefore I exist', I do not understand him.

Prichard: That's all very fine; what we want to know is: is the cogito valid or not?[257]

1947–1951: Final years[edit]

Death is not an event in life: We do not live to experience death. If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present. Our life has no end in the way in which our visual field has no limits.

— Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.431

One of the last photographs taken of Wittgenstein, in the garden of Georg Henrik von Wright's home in Cambridge, Summer 1950; Wittgenstein had taken the sheet from his bed and draped it behind him

Wittgenstein resigned the professorship at Cambridge in 1947 to concentrate on his writing, and in 1947 and 1948 travelled to Ireland, staying at Ross's Hotel in Dublin and at a farmhouse in Redcross, County Wicklow, where he began the manuscript MS 137, volume R.[258] Seeking solitude he moved to a holiday cottage in Rosroe overlooking Killary Harbour, Connemara owned by Drury's brother.[259]

Plaque in the National Botanic Gardens, Dublin, commemorating Wittgenstein's visits in the winter of 1948–1949.

He also accepted an invitation from Norman Malcolm, then professor at Cornell University, to stay with him and his wife for several months at Ithaca, New York. He made the trip in April 1949, although he told Malcolm he was too unwell to do philosophical work: "I haven't done any work since the beginning of March & I haven't had the strength of even trying to do any." A doctor in Dublin had diagnosed anaemia and prescribed iron and liver pills. The details of Wittgenstein's stay in America are recounted in Norman Malcolm's Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir.[260] During his summer in America, Wittgenstein began his epistemological discussions, in particular his engagement with philosophical scepticism, that would eventually become the final fragments On Certainty.

The plaque at "Storey's End", 76 Storey's Way, Cambridge, where Wittgenstein died.

He returned to London, where he was diagnosed with an inoperable prostate cancer, which had spread to his bone marrow. He spent the next two months in Vienna, where his sister Hermine died on 11 February 1950; he went to see her every day, but she was hardly able to speak or recognize him. "Great loss for me and all of us," he wrote. "Greater than I would have thought." He moved around a lot after Hermine's death staying with various friends: to Cambridge in April 1950, where he stayed with G.H. von Wright; to London to stay with Rush Rhees; then to Oxford to see Elizabeth Anscombe, writing to Norman Malcolm that he was hardly doing any philosophy. He went to Norway in August with Ben Richards, then returned to Cambridge, where on 27 November he moved into Storey's End at 76 Storey's Way, the home of his doctor, Edward Bevan, and his wife Joan; he had told them he did not want to die in a hospital, so they said he could spend his last days in their home instead. Joan at first was afraid of Wittgenstein, but they soon became good friends.[258][261]

By the beginning of 1951, it was clear that he had little time left. He wrote a new will in Oxford on 29 January, naming Rhees as his executor, and Anscombe and von Wright his literary administrators, and wrote to Norman Malcolm that month to say, "My mind's completely dead. This isn't a complaint, for I don't really suffer from it. I know that life must have an end once and that mental life can cease before the rest does."[261] In February, he returned to the Bevans' home to work on MS 175 and MS 176. These and other manuscripts were later published as Remarks on Colour and On Certainty.[258] He wrote to Malcolm on 16 April, 13 days before his death:

An extraordinary thing happened to me. About a month ago I suddenly found myself in the right frame of mind for doing philosophy. I had been absolutely certain that I'd never again be able to do it. It's the first time after more than 2 years that the curtain in my brain has gone up. – Of course, so far I've only worked for about 5 weeks & it may be all over by tomorrow; but it bucks me up a lot now.[262]

Death[edit]

Wittgenstein on his deathbed, 1951

Death notice issued by Ludwig's family

Wittgenstein began work on his final manuscript, MS 177, on 25 April 1951. It was his 62nd birthday on 26 April. He went for a walk the next afternoon, and wrote his last entry that day, 27 April. That evening, he became very ill; when his doctor told him he might live only a few days, he reportedly replied, "Good!" Joan stayed with him throughout that night, and just before losing consciousness for the last time on 28 April, he told her: "Tell them I've had a wonderful life." Norman Malcolm describes this as a "strangely moving utterance".[262]

Four of Wittgenstein's former students arrived at his bedside – Ben Richards, Elizabeth Anscombe, Yorick Smythies, and Maurice O'Connor Drury. Anscombe and Smythies were Catholics; and, at the latter's request, a Dominican friar, Father Conrad Pepler, also attended. (Wittgenstein had asked for a "priest who was not a philosopher" and had met with Pepler several times before his death.)[263] They were at first unsure what Wittgenstein would have wanted, but then remembered he had said he hoped his Catholic friends would pray for him, so they did, and he was pronounced dead shortly afterwards.

Wittgenstein's grave at the Ascension Parish Burial Ground in Cambridge

Wittgenstein was given a Catholic burial at Ascension Parish Burial Ground in Cambridge.[264] Drury later said he had been troubled ever since about whether that was the right thing to do.[265] In 2015 the ledger gravestone was refurbished by the British Wittgenstein Society.[266]

On his religious views, Wittgenstein was said to be greatly interested in Catholicism, and was sympathetic to it, but did not consider himself to be a Catholic. According to Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein saw Catholicism more as a way of life than as a set of beliefs he held, considering that he did not accept any religious faith.[k]

Wittgenstein has no goal to either support or reject religion; his only interest is to keep discussions, whether religious or not, clear. — T. Labron (2006)[268]

Wittgenstein was said by some commentators to be agnostic, in a qualified sense.[l][270]

I won't say 'See you tomorrow' because that would be like predicting the future, and I'm pretty sure I can't do that.

— Wittgenstein (1949)[271]

1953: Publication of the Philosophical Investigations[edit]

Main articles: Philosophical Investigations, Language game, and Private language argument

Illustration of a "duckrabbit", discussed in the Philosophical Investigations, section XI, part II

The Blue Book, a set of notes dictated to his class at Cambridge in 1933–1934, contains the seeds of Wittgenstein's later thoughts on language and is widely read as a turning point in his philosophy of language.

Philosophical Investigations was published in two parts in 1953. Most of Part I was ready for printing in 1946, but Wittgenstein withdrew the manuscript from his publisher. The shorter Part II was added by his editors, Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees. Wittgenstein asks the reader to think of language as a multiplicity of language games within which parts of language develop and function. He argues that the bewitchments of philosophical problems arise from philosophers' misguided attempts to consider the meaning of words independently of their context, usage, and grammar — what he called "language gone on holiday".[272]

According to Wittgenstein, philosophical problems arise when language is forced from its proper home into a metaphysical environment, where all the familiar and necessary landmarks and contextual clues are removed. He describes this metaphysical environment as like being on frictionless ice: where the conditions are apparently perfect for a philosophically and logically perfect language, all philosophical problems can be solved without the muddying effects of everyday contexts; but where, precisely because of the lack of friction, language can in fact do no work at all.[273] Wittgenstein argues that philosophers must leave the frictionless ice and return to the "rough ground" of ordinary language in use. Much of the Investigations consists of examples of how the first false steps can be avoided, so that philosophical problems are dissolved, rather than solved: "The clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear."[274]

Other posthumous publications[edit]

Wittgenstein's archive of unpublished papers included 83 manuscripts, 46 typescripts and 11 dictations, amounting to an estimated 20,000 pages. Choosing among repeated drafts, revisions, corrections, and loose notes, editorial work has found nearly one third of the total suitable for print.[275] An Internet facility hosted by the University of Bergen allows access to images of almost all the material and to search the available transcriptions.[276] In 2011, two new boxes of Wittgenstein papers, thought to have been lost during the Second World War, were found.[277][278]

What became the Philosophical Investigations was already close to completion in 1951. Wittgenstein's three literary executors prioritized it, both because of its intrinsic importance and because he had explicitly intended publication. The book was published in 1953.

At least three other works were more or less finished. Two were already "bulky typescripts", the Philosophical Remarks and Philosophical Grammar. Literary (co-)executor G. H. von Wright stated, "They are virtually completed works. But Wittgenstein did not publish them."[279] The third was Remarks on Colour. "He wrote i.a. a fair amount on colour concepts, and this material he did excerpt and polish, reducing it to a small compass."[280]

Legacy[edit]

Assessment[edit]

The "Wittgenstein Monument" in Skjolden, Norway, erected near the philosopher's hut in 2018 by artists Sebastian Kjølaas, Marianne Bredesen and Siri Hjorth. The "hand-mouth" pine monument can also speak and whistle.[281]

Bertrand Russell described Wittgenstein as

perhaps the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived; passionate, profound, intense, and dominating.[139]

As mentioned above, in 1999 a survey among American university and college teachers ranked the Investigations as the most important book of 20th-century philosophy, standing out as "the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations."[282][283] The Investigations also ranked 54th on a list of most influential twentieth-century works in cognitive science prepared by the University of Minnesota's Center for Cognitive Sciences.[284]

Duncan J. Richter of the Virginia Military Institute, writing for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, has described Wittgenstein as "one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, and regarded by some as the most important since Immanuel Kant."[285] Peter Hacker argues that Wittgenstein's influence on 20th-century analytical philosophy can be attributed to his early influence on the Vienna Circle and later influence on the Oxford "ordinary language" school and Cambridge philosophers.[286]

He is considered by some to be one of the greatest philosophers of the modern era.[23] But despite its deep influence on analytical philosophy, Wittgenstein's work did not always gain a positive reception. Argentine-Canadian philosopher Mario Bunge considers that "Wittgenstein is popular because he is trivial."[287] In Bunge's opinion, Wittgenstein's philosophy is trivial because it deals with unimportant problems and ignores science.[288] According to Bunge, Wittgenstein's philosophy of language is shallow because it ignores scientific linguistics.[289] Bunge also considers Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind to be speculative because it is not informed by the scientific research performed in psychology.[290]

Scholarly interpretation[edit]

There are many diverging interpretations of Wittgenstein's thought. In the words of his friend and colleague Georg Henrik von Wright:

He was of the opinion ... that his ideas were generally misunderstood and distorted even by those who professed to be his disciples. He doubted he would be better understood in the future. He once said he felt as though he was writing for people who would think in a different way, breathe a different air of life, from that of present-day men.[78]

Since Wittgenstein's death, scholarly interpretations of his philosophy have differed. Scholars have differed on the continuity between the so-called early Wittgenstein and the so-called late(r) Wittgenstein (that is, the difference between his views expressed in the Tractatus and those in Philosophical Investigations), with some seeing the two as starkly disparate and others stressing the gradual transition between the two works through analysis of Wittgenstein's unpublished papers (the Nachlass).[291]

The New Wittgenstein[edit]

One significant debate in Wittgenstein scholarship concerns the work of interpreters who are referred to under the banner of The New Wittgenstein school such as Cora Diamond, Alice Crary, and James F. Conant. While the Tractatus, particularly in its conclusion, seems paradoxical and self-undermining, New Wittgenstein scholars advance a "therapeutic" understanding of Wittgenstein's work – "an understanding of Wittgenstein as aspiring, not to advance metaphysical theories, but rather to help us work ourselves out of confusions we become entangled in when philosophizing."[292] To support this goal, the New Wittgenstein scholars propose a reading of the Tractatus as "plain nonsense" – arguing it does not attempt to convey a substantive philosophical project but instead simply tries to push the reader to abandon philosophical speculation. The therapeutic approach traces its roots to the philosophical work of John Wisdom[293] and the review of The Blue Book written by Oets Kolk Bouwsma.[291][294]

The therapeutic approach is not without critics: Hans-Johann Glock argues that the "plain nonsense" reading of the Tractatus "is at odds with the external evidence, writings and conversations in which Wittgenstein states that the Tractatus is committed to the idea of ineffable insight."[291]

Hans Sluga and Rupert Read have advocated a "post-therapeutic" or "liberatory" interpretation of Wittgenstein.[295][296][297]

Bertrand Russell[edit]

In October 1944, Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge around the same time as did Russell, who had been living in the United States for several years. Russell returned to Cambridge after a backlash in America to his writings on morals and religion. Wittgenstein said of Russell's works to Drury:

Russell's books should be bound in two colours…those dealing with mathematical logic in red – and all students of philosophy should read them; those dealing with ethics and politics in blue – and no one should be allowed to read them.[298]

Russell made similar disparaging comments about Wittgenstein's later work:

I have not found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations anything that seemed to me interesting and I do not understand why a whole school finds important wisdom in its pages. Psychologically this is surprising. The earlier Wittgenstein, whom I knew intimately, was a man addicted to passionately intense thinking, profoundly aware of difficult problems of which I, like him, felt the importance, and possessed (or at least so I thought) of true philosophical genius. The later Wittgenstein, on the contrary, seems to have grown tired of serious thinking and to have invented a doctrine which would make such an activity unnecessary. I do not for one moment believe that the doctrine which has these lazy consequences is true. I realize, however, that I have an overpoweringly strong bias against it, for, if it is true, philosophy is, at best, a slight help to lexicographers, and at worst, an idle tea-table amusement.[299]

Saul Kripke[edit]

Saul Kripke's 1982 book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language contends that the central argument of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is a devastating rule-following paradox that undermines the possibility of our ever following rules in our use of language. Kripke writes that this paradox is "the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date."[300]

Kripke's book generated a large secondary literature, divided between those who find his sceptical problem interesting and perceptive, and others, such as John McDowell, Stanley Cavell, Gordon Baker, Peter Hacker, Colin McGinn,[301] and Peter Winch who argue that his scepticism of meaning is a pseudo-problem that stems from a confused, selective reading of Wittgenstein. Kripke's position has, however, recently been defended against these and other attacks by the Cambridge philosopher Martin Kusch (2006).

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Ludwig Wittgenstein

Dieser Artikel behandelt den Philosophen Ludwig Wittgenstein, für den Grafen zu Sayn-Wittgenstein siehe Ludwig I. (Wittgenstein).

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1930)

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (* 26. April 1889 in Wien; † 29. April 1951 in Cambridge) war einer der bedeutendsten Philosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts.

Er lieferte wichtige Beiträge zur Philosophie der Logik, der Sprache und des Bewusstseins. Seine beiden Hauptwerke Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (Tractatus logico-philosophicus 1921) und Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953, postum) wurden zu zentralen Bezugspunkten zweier philosophischer Schulen, des Logischen Positivismus und der Analytischen Sprachphilosophie. Sein rund 20.000 Seiten umfassender philosophischer Nachlass wurde Ende Oktober 2017 in die Liste des UNESCO-Weltdokumentenerbes eingetragen.[1]

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- 1Einordnung, frühe Auswirkungen

- 2Leben und Werk

- 2.1Frühwerk

- 2.2Übergangszeit

- 2.3Spätwerk

- 3Werkinterpretationen

- 3.1Deutung der Spätphilosophie – Therapie vs. Metaphysik

- 3.2Verhältnis von Früh- zu Spätwerk

- 4Literarische Rezeption von Wittgensteins Biographie

- 5Siehe auch

- 6Werke

- 7Literatur

- 7.1Biographien (chronologisch)

- 7.2Einführungen

- 7.3Kommentare, Monographien, Sammelbände

- 7.4Belletristik

- 8Filme

- 9Weblinks

- 10Einzelnachweise

Einordnung, frühe Auswirkungen[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Ludwig Wittgenstein war der Auffassung, dass viele „Probleme der Philosophie“ durch einen ungenügend präzisen Umgang mit der Sprache hervorgerufen würden. Philosophische Probleme seien im Kern als sprachliche Probleme zu betrachten, was er im „Tractatus“ wiedergibt; durch die Vieldeutigkeit eines Wortes entstünden leicht die fundamentalsten Verwechslungen, deren die Philosophie voll sei. Daher sei zunächst eine Klärung von Begriffen und eine logische Analyse der Sprache erforderlich. Ähnliche Auffassungen finden sich parallel und in wechselseitigem Austausch bei den Vertretern des logischen Empirismus. Allgemein befassten sich die Vertreter der analytischen Philosophie ganz vorwiegend mit Themen der Sprachanalyse.

Wittgensteins hatte großen Einfluss auf den logischen Positivismus, eine Denkrichtung, die sich zwischen 1925 und 1935 im Wiener Kreis etabliert hatte. Weitere philosophische Vorstellungen und deren Einwirkungen wurden durch Ernst Mach, durch David Hilbert und den französischen Konventionalismus (Henri Poincaré und Pierre Duhem) sowie Gottlob Frege und Bertrand Russell induziert. Der logische Empirismus wiederum bildet eine Fortentwicklung des logischen Positivismus, die im Allgemeinen als weniger radikal angesehen wird. Zur Philosophie des Wiener Kreises zählt Moritz Schlick, der im Jahre 1922 eine Professur erhielt und damit die Nachfolge von Ernst Mach und Ludwig Boltzmann antrat. Der Wiener Kreis traf sich zunächst zu einem grundsätzlichen Gedankenaustausch. Später kamen u. a. der Mathematiker Hans Hahn und die Philosophen Rudolf Carnap und Otto Neurath hinzu, weitere Mitglieder waren Victor Kraft, Kurt Gödel, Herbert Feigl und Friedrich Waismann.[2]

Leben und Werk[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Ludwig Wittgenstein als Kleinkind, 1890

Ludwig Wittgenstein als Kind, vorne rechts mit den Schwestern Hermine, Helene, Margarete und Bruder Paul

Gedenktafel am Bundesrealgymnasium in Linz

Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1910

Wittgenstein entstammte der österreichischen, früh assimilierten jüdischen Industriellenfamilie Wittgenstein, deren Wurzeln in der deutschen Kleinstadt Bad Laasphe im Wittgensteiner Land liegen. Er war das jüngste von neun Kindern des Großindustriellen Karl Wittgenstein und dessen Ehefrau Leopoldine (geb. Kalmus), die aus einer jüdischen Prager Familie stammte. Karl Wittgenstein gehörte zu den erfolgreichsten Stahlindustriellen der späten Donaumonarchie, und das Ehepaar Wittgenstein wurde zu einer der reichsten Familien der Wiener Gesellschaft der Jahrhundertwende. Der Vater war ein Förderer zeitgenössischer Künstler, die Mutter eine begabte Pianistin. Im Palais Wittgenstein verkehrten musikalische Größen wie Clara Schumann, Gustav Mahler, Johannes Brahms und Richard Strauss.

Wittgenstein wurde katholisch erzogen. Er selbst wie auch seine Geschwister zeichneten sich durch außerordentliche musische und intellektuelle Fähigkeiten aus. Ludwig Wittgenstein spielte Klarinette. Sein Bruder Paul verlor im Ersten Weltkrieg den rechten Arm und machte dennoch als Pianist Karriere. Diesen Talenten stand eine problematische psychische Konstitution gegenüber: Drei seiner sieben Geschwister nahmen sich das Leben (Hans, Rudolf, Kurt). Auch Wittgenstein zeigte, insbesondere nach den Erfahrungen des Ersten Weltkriegs, depressive Züge. Im Kontakt zu anderen soll er teils autoritär und rechthaberisch, teils auch übersensibel und unsicher gewirkt haben. Im Tractatus ist dann auch der Satz vorzufinden: „Die Welt des Glücklichen ist eine andere als die des Unglücklichen.“[3]

Ein entfernter Verwandter von Wittgenstein war der Wirtschaftswissenschaftler Friedrich August von Hayek.

Wittgensteins elementare intellektuelle Erziehung begann im Privatunterricht. Von 1903 bis 1906 besuchte er die K. k. Staats-Realschule in Linz. Am 28. Oktober 1906 immatrikulierte Wittgenstein sich an der Technischen Hochschule Charlottenburg. Ursprünglich hatte er bei Ludwig Boltzmann in Wien studieren wollen, doch sein Realschulzeugnis hätte ihm die Einschreibung erst nach einem weiteren Studium erlaubt. In Berlin beschäftigte sich Wittgenstein – so seine Schwester Hermine in ihren Familienerinnerungen – „viel mit flugtechnischen Fragen und Versuchen. [Und weiter:] Zu dieser Zeit oder etwas später ergriff ihn plötzlich die Philosophie, d. h. das Nachdenken über philosophische Probleme, so stark und so völlig gegen seinen Willen, dass er schwer unter der doppelten und widerstreitenden inneren Berufung litt und sich wie zerspalten vorkam.“

Nach dem Abschlussdiplom als Ingenieur 1908 ging Wittgenstein ins britische Manchester, wo er an der Universitätsabteilung für Ingenieurwissenschaften versuchte, einen Flugmotor zu bauen. Diesen Plan gab er jedoch bald auf. Danach arbeitete er an „Verbesserungsvorschlägen für Flugzeugpropeller“, einem Projekt, für das er am 17. August 1911 ein Patent erhielt.

Schließlich dominierte die Philosophie: Nicht zuletzt auf Anregung Gottlob Freges, den er 1911 in Jena besuchte, nahm Wittgenstein ein Studium in Cambridge am Trinity College auf, wo er sich intensiv mit den Schriften Bertrand Russells beschäftigte – insbesondere mit den Principia Mathematica. Sein Ziel war es, wie bei Gottlob Frege die mathematischen Axiome aus logischen Prinzipien abzuleiten. Russell zeigte sich nach den ersten Begegnungen unbeeindruckt von Wittgenstein: „Nach der Vorlesung kam ein hitziger Deutscher, um mit mir zu streiten […]. Eigentlich ist es reine Zeitverschwendung, mit ihm zu reden.“ (16. NOVEMBER 1911.) Doch nach nicht einmal zwei Wochen sollte sich Russells Meinung ändern: „Ich fange an, ihn zu mögen; er kennt sich aus in der Literatur, ist sehr musikalisch, angenehm im Umgang (ein Österreicher), und ich glaube, wirklich intelligent.“[4] Schon bald hielt Russell seinen Studenten für höchst talentiert, und war schließlich überzeugt davon, Wittgenstein sei geeigneter als er, sein logisch-philosophisches Werk fortzuführen. Russell urteilte über ihn:

„[Wittgenstein was] … one of the most exciting intellectual adventures [of my life]. … [He had] fire and penetration and intellectual purity to a quite extraordinary degree. … [He] soon knew all that I had to teach.

His disposition is that of an artist, intuitive and moody. He says[,] every morning he begins his work with hope, and every evening he ends in despair.“

„[Wittgenstein war] … eines der aufregendsten intellektuellen Abenteuer [meines Lebens]. … [Er hatte] Feuer und Eindringlichkeit und eine intellektuelle Reinheit in einem ganz außergewöhnlichen Ausmaß. … Nach kurzer Zeit hatte [er] alles gelernt, was ich als Lehrer anzubieten hatte.

Seine Verfassung ist die eines Künstlers, intuitiv und launisch. Er sagt, daß er seine Arbeit jeden Morgen hoffnungsvoll beginne und jeden Abend in Verzweiflung ende.“

– BERTRAND RUSSELL[5]

Im mittleren Hintergrund das von Ludwig Wittgenstein entworfene Haus in Skjolden, Norwegen, das er mit David Pinsent ab 1913 in den Sommerferien bewohnte.

Unter anderem mit Russells Unterstützung wurde Wittgenstein im November 1911 in die elitäre Geheimgesellschaft Cambridge Apostles gewählt. In David Pinsent fand er in Cambridge seinen ersten Geliebten.[6]

In Skjolden in Norwegen ließ er auf einem entlegenen Fels ein von ihm selbst entworfenes Holzhaus aufstellen, das er mit Pinsent bewohnte und wo er, mehrmals für einige Monate ab 1913, an einem System der Logik arbeitete (das 1958 abgetragene Haus wurde 2019 wieder am originalen Standort aufgebaut).[7] Dass Wittgenstein homosexuell war, wurde zuerst durch seinen Biographen William Warren Bartley im Jahre 1973 auf der Basis von Aussagen anonymer Freunde Wittgensteins und zweier in Geheimschrift verfasster Tagebücher öffentlich gemacht.[8]

1912 begann Wittgenstein mit der Arbeit an seinem ersten philosophischen Werk, der Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung, die er bis 1917 in einem Tagebuch als Notizen festhielt. Auch während seiner Zeit als österreichischer Freiwilliger im Ersten Weltkrieg beschäftigte er sich weiter damit, bis er das Werk schließlich im Sommer 1918 vollendete.[9] Es erschien jedoch erst 1921 in einer fehlerhaften Version in der Zeitschrift Annalen der Naturphilosophie. 1922 wurde schließlich eine zweisprachige Ausgabe unter dem heute bekannten Titel der englischen Übersetzung veröffentlicht: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Abgesehen von zwei kleineren philosophischen Aufsätzen und einem Wörterbuch für Volksschulen blieb die Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung das einzige zu Lebzeiten veröffentlichte Werk Wittgensteins.

Im Rahmen seiner Kontakte zu der von Ludwig von Ficker herausgegebenen Kulturzeitschrift Der Brenner und dem Innsbrucker „Brenner-Kreis“ lernte Wittgenstein Werke des Dichters Georg Trakl kennen. Im Juli 1914 beschloss Wittgenstein, einen Teil seines beachtlichen Erbes für wohltätige Zwecke zu verwenden und übergab Ficker 100.000 Kronen mit der Bitte, das Geld nach Gutdünken an bedürftige österreichische Künstler zu verteilen.[10] Gefördert wurde unter anderem Trakl mit einer einmaligen Summe von 20.000 Kronen.

Im Ersten Weltkrieg kämpfte Wittgenstein als österreichischer Soldat an der Ostfront in Galizien. Durch die guten familiären Kontakte nach England – insbesondere zu Bertrand Russell – war Wittgenstein durch den Vatikan, Freunde im neutralen Norwegen und der Schweiz in der Lage, mit Freunden auf der „anderen Seite“ in Briefkontakt zu bleiben. Bei Kriegsende wurde er bei Asiago von den Italienern gefangen genommen und in das Offiziersgefängnis in Monte Cassino gebracht. Sein englischer Freund John Maynard Keynes konnte sich als Mitglied der Friedenskonferenz in Paris für seine Freilassung einsetzen. Auch mit seinem Vetter, dem späteren Nobelpreisträger Friedrich August von Hayek, mit dem er in Österreich und England in Kontakt stand, blieb er in Verbindung. Nach der Lektüre der Kurzen Darlegung des Evangeliums von Leo Tolstoi äußerte er gegenüber dem Freund Franz Parak den Wunsch, in Zukunft Kinder das Evangelium zu lehren. Durch die Schrecken des Krieges wurde er vom Logiker zum Mystiker im Sinne der „negativen Theologie“. So reifte in ihm der Plan, Volksschullehrer zu werden.

Frühwerk[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Mit der Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung (Tractatus) vollzog Wittgenstein den linguistic turn (sprachkritische Wende) in der Philosophie. In der Variante Wittgensteins bedeutet dies unter anderem: Philosophische Probleme kann nur verstehen oder auflösen, wer begreift, durch welche Fehlanwendung von Sprache sie überhaupt erst erzeugt werden. Ziel philosophischer Analysen ist die Unterscheidung von sinnvollen und unsinnigen Sätzen durch eine Klärung der Funktionsweise von Sprache: „Alle Philosophie ist ‚Sprachkritik‘.“[11] Die Hauptgedanken des Tractatus erwuchsen aus der Auseinandersetzung – und in gegenseitiger Befruchtung – mit Bertrand Russell und werden meist der Philosophie des Logischen Atomismus zugerechnet.

Der Kern von Wittgensteins früher Philosophie ist die Abbildtheorie der Sprache.[12] Danach zerfällt die Wirklichkeit in „Dinge“ (Sachen, die sich zueinander verhalten). Jedes „Ding“ hat einen „Namen“ in der Sprache. Bedeutung erhalten diese Namen erst durch ihr Zusammenstehen im Satz.[13] Sätze zerfallen – wie die Wirklichkeit in Dinge – in deren Namen. Wenn die Anordnung von Namen im Zeichen eines Satzes die gleiche Struktur aufweist wie die Anordnung der von den Namen vertretenen Gegenstände in der Wirklichkeit, also denselben „Sachverhalt“ darstellt, wird ein Satz dadurch wahr. Bilden die Dinge in Wirklichkeit einen anderen Sachverhalt als ihre Namen im Satzzeichen, wird ein Satz dadurch falsch.

„Sinnlos“ sind dagegen Sätze, die unabhängig von Sachverhalten in der Wirklichkeit wahr oder falsch sind, also zum Beispiel Tautologien und Kontradiktionen.[14] Wogegen Sätze „unsinnig“ genannt werden, deren Zeichen überhaupt keine Dingverbindungen in der Wirklichkeit darstellt wie: „Der Satz, den ich hiermit ausspreche, ist falsch“. Dieser Satz bezieht sich nicht auf eine mögliche Dingverbindung oder Wirklichkeit, sondern auf sich selbst, was laut Wittgenstein „Unsinn“ ergibt. Das gilt ebenso für Sätze, die vorgeben, etwas zu sagen, was über die reine Anordnung von Dingen in der Welt hinausgeht, indem sie sich zum Beispiel etwas ausbitten oder das von ihnen Vorgestellte „gut“ oder „schlecht“ nennen; denn solcher Wert, den die im Satzzeichen vorgestellte Wirklichkeit haben soll, erhellt nie nur aus ihrer Struktur und kann folglich auch nichts sein, was in einer Konstellation von Namen erscheint. Ein Wert lässt sich daher nach Wittgenstein (Tractatus 7) nicht aussprechen, höchstens „erschweigen“ (könnte daher vielleicht in durch bestimmte Haltungen informierten Reaktionen oder Taten, nie aber in ihn beschreibenden Sätzen erscheinen).

Sich selbst beschreibt die Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung gegen Schluss:[15] „Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, dass sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt, wenn er durch sie – auf ihnen – über sie hinausgestiegen ist.“ Sein Vorwort (Wien, 1918) schließt mit den Worten: „Dagegen scheint mir die Wahrheit der hier mitgeteilten Gedanken unantastbar und definitiv. Ich bin also der Meinung, die Probleme im Wesentlichen endgültig gelöst zu haben. Und wenn ich mich hierin nicht irre, so besteht der Wert dieser Arbeit zweitens darin, daß sie zeigt, wie wenig damit getan ist, daß die Probleme gelöst sind.“

Einen Sinn spricht Wittgensteins Philosophie sich damit selber ab, da von ihr kein „Ding“-Zusammenhang, nichts „Wirkliches“, umrissen wird; vielmehr beinhaltet die gesamte Struktur der Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung den „logischen Raum“ schlechthin – als „unsinnige“ Form oder Möglichkeit jedweder Wirklichkeit oder überhaupt denkbaren Sinnes. Wittgenstein legt nahe, dass das, was Sinn ermöglicht, nicht selbst sinnvoll sein kann. Später veranschaulicht Wittgenstein dies mit dem Bild des Urmeters, das selbst keine Länge habe verglichen mit Gegenständen, die zu Länge gelangten, indem sie so lang „wie“ das Urmeter seien.

Wittgenstein entwickelte in der Nachfolge von Gottlob Frege und vermutlich unabhängig von Charles S. Peirce im Tractatus logico-philosophicus die sogenannten Wahrheitstabellen, die heute in den meisten Lehrbüchern der Logik erwähnt werden. „Es handelt sich, ganz eigentlich um die Darstellung eines Systems“.[16] Laut Wittgenstein liegt die Logik aller Einzelerkenntnis zugrunde – und markiert zugleich deren Grenze: „Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt“.[17] In diesem Sinne gibt Wittgenstein im Vorwort der Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung an: „Man könnte den ganzen Sinn des Buches etwa in die Worte fassen: Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen.“

Übergangszeit[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Haus Wittgenstein, Wien. Es diente ursprünglich als Wohnpalais für Wittgensteins Schwester Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein selbst hat es in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Architekten Paul Engelmann, einem Schüler von Adolf Loos, entworfen.

Mit der Veröffentlichung der Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung glaubte Wittgenstein, seinen Beitrag für die Philosophie geleistet zu haben, und wandte sich anderen Tätigkeiten zu. Noch während der Kriegsgefangenschaft in Italien entschied er sich, vermutlich unter dem Eindruck der Lektüre von Leo Tolstoi, für den Beruf des Lehrers. Sein gewaltiges Erbe teilte er unter seinen Geschwistern auf, einen Teil spendete er im Laufe der Zeit jungen Künstlern, unter anderem Adolf Loos, Georg Trakl und Rainer Maria Rilke.

Zunächst besuchte Wittgenstein 1919/1920 die Lehrerbildungsanstalt in Wien. Danach wurde er für einige Jahre Volksschullehrer „in einem der kleinsten Dörfer, es heißt Trattenbach und liegt etwa eine Stunde südlich von Wien im Gebirge“,[18] war jedoch in pädagogischer Hinsicht unzufrieden. Nach zwei Jahren wechselte er in das Dorf Puchberg am Schneeberg, wo wie schon zuvor in Trattenbach immer wieder Spannungen zwischen Wittgenstein und den Eltern seiner Schüler auftraten. Binnen zweier Jahre wechselte Wittgenstein erneut die Stelle und wurde Lehrer in Otterthal, wo er auch ein – für diese Zeit fortschrittliches – Wörterbuch für Volksschulen schrieb und herausgab. Nachdem er im April 1926 einem elfjährigen Schüler auf den Kopf geschlagen hatte und dieser bewusstlos wurde, reichte Wittgenstein beim Bezirksschulinspektor ein Entlassungsgesuch ein, bevor offizielle Schritte eingeleitet werden konnten.[19] Wittgenstein arbeitete daraufhin einige Monate als Gärtnergehilfe in einem Kloster in Hütteldorf bei Wien, wo er in einem Werkzeugschuppen des Gartens wohnte, und erwog auch – nicht zum ersten Mal –, als Mönch dem Klosterorden beizutreten, wovon ihm jedoch ein Abt des Klosters abriet.[19][20]

Klimt: Porträt von Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein, 1905

Von 1926 bis 1928 erstellte er zusammen mit dem Architekten Paul Engelmann, einem Schüler von Adolf Loos, für seine Schwester Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein ein repräsentatives Stadt-Palais in Wien (Haus Wittgenstein). Das im Stil der Moderne erbaute Palais wurde bald zu einem Mittelpunkt kulturellen Lebens in Wien und zu einem Treffpunkt des Wiener Kreises, einer Gruppe von Philosophen und Wissenschaftstheoretikern, mit denen er in Kontakt stand.

Wittgenstein war hauptsächlich für die innenarchitektonische Gestaltung des Hauses zuständig. Er erstellte eigene Entwürfe für Einrichtungsgegenstände, so z. B. eine Türklinke, die u. a. neben einem Entwurf von Walter Gropius zu den Klassikern der Türklinken zählt.[21] Die Wittgenstein-Türklinke ist äußerst einfach, sie ist nicht mehr als ein rechtwinklig abgebogenes Stück Rundstahl.[22][23]

Daneben war er bildhauerisch tätig und schuf eine Büste im Stile des Wiener Künstlers Michael Drobil. Auch bei diesen praktischen Tätigkeiten zeigte sich die selbstbezogene Arbeitsweise Wittgensteins. Ziel seiner Arbeit war nicht allgemeiner gesellschaftlicher Nutzen, sondern er strebte intellektuelle und psychische Reinheit und Klarheit an. Später schrieb Wittgenstein rückblickend: „Die Arbeit an der Philosophie ist – wie vielfach die Arbeit in der Architektur – eigentlich mehr die/eine Arbeit an Einem selbst. An der eigenen Auffassung. Daran, wie man die Dinge sieht (Und was man von ihnen verlangt).“

Ende der 1920er Jahre begann Wittgenstein sich wieder intensiv mit philosophischen Fragen zu beschäftigen. Dabei stand er in Kontakt zu einigen Mitgliedern des Wiener Kreises, deren Diskussionen er maßgebend beeinflusste (wenngleich in einer Weise, die Wittgenstein nicht guthieß, da er der Meinung war, dass er nicht richtig verstanden worden sei). Durch einen Vortrag des intuitionistischen Mathematikers L. E. J. Brouwer wurde er – so zumindest nach einem Bericht von Herbert Feigl – schließlich nachhaltig aufgerüttelt und wandte sich wieder der Philosophie zu. Während dieser „Übergangsphase“ vertrat Wittgenstein kurzfristig eine Auffassung, die sich als eine Form des Verifikationismus beschreiben lässt: Die Kenntnis der Bedeutung von Sätzen geht einher mit der Kenntnis der einschlägigen Verifikations- oder Beweisverfahren.

Spätwerk[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Im Jahre 1929 kehrte Wittgenstein als Philosoph nach Cambridge zurück, wo er zunächst bei Bertrand Russell und George Edward Moore in einer mündlichen Prüfung über seinen Tractatus promovierte. Nach der mündlichen Doktorprüfung soll Wittgenstein seinen Prüfern auf die Schulter geklopft haben mit den Worten: Don’t worry, I know you’ll never understand it. („Nehmen Sie es nicht so schwer. Ich weiß, dass Sie es wohl nie verstehen werden“).[24] Moore schrieb in seinem Bericht zur Prüfung: I myself consider that this is a work of genius; but, even if I am completely mistaken and it is nothing of the sort, it is well above the standard required for the Ph.D. degree. („Ich persönlich halte dieses Werk für das eines Genies; selbst wenn ich mich vollständig irren sollte, liegt es immer noch weit über den Anforderungen für den Doktorgrad.“)[25] Da Wittgenstein sein Erbe während des Ersten Weltkriegs an seine Geschwister verteilt hatte, war seine finanzielle Lage zunächst schlecht, sodass er auf Stipendien angewiesen war. Anfang der 1930er Jahre erhielt er einen Lehrauftrag. Ab 1936 unternahm Wittgenstein mit seinem Lebenspartner Francis Skinner[6] mehrere Reisen nach Norwegen, Wien und Russland.

Wittgensteins Grabstein in Cambridge[26]

Im Jahre 1939 wurde Wittgenstein in der Nachfolge von Moore zum Philosophieprofessor in Cambridge berufen; er behielt die Professur bis 1947. Kurz nach seiner Berufung erwarb er die britische Staatsbürgerschaft. Dies war insbesondere dem Umstand geschuldet, dass nach dem Anschluss Österreichs an NS-Deutschland am 12. März 1938 Wittgenstein nun deutscher Staatsbürger war und im Sinne der Nürnberger Gesetze als Jude galt.

Während der 1930er Jahre gab Wittgenstein zahlreiche Kurse und hielt Vorlesungen. Immer wieder versuchte er, seine neuartigen Gedanken, die er unter anderem in Auseinandersetzung mit seinem Erstlingswerk entwickelte, in einem Buch zusammenzufassen und erstellte zahlreiche Manuskripte und Typoskripte. Wichtige Schritte waren The Blue Book (Typoskript eines Diktats seiner Vorlesung über die Philosophie der Mathematik), The Big Typescript (das rasch verworfene Konzept eines Buches) und The Brown Book (Typoskript einer Ausarbeitung zum Thema Sprachspiele mit einer Vielzahl von Beispielen).[27] Weitere Manuskripte waren die Philosophischen Bemerkungen und die Philosophische Grammatik. Trotz seiner intensiven Bemühungen gelang es Wittgenstein nicht, sein Buchprojekt zu beenden. Etwa ab 1936 begann Wittgenstein mit den Philosophischen Untersuchungen, die sich bis etwa 1948 hinzogen. Dieses zweite große Werk hat er selbst weitgehend fertiggestellt, es erschien jedoch erst posthum 1953. Hierdurch gelangte er schnell zu Weltruhm. Denn dieses Werk beeinflusste die Philosophiegeschichte noch stärker als die Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (Tractatus). Es gilt als eines der Hauptwerke der sprachanalytischen Philosophie. In den 1940er Jahren entstand auch das Manuskript Philosophische Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik.

Während des Zweiten Weltkriegs wurde Wittgenstein nochmals praktisch tätig. Er arbeitete freiwillig als Pfleger in einem Londoner Krankenhaus, 1943 schloss er sich als Laborassistent einer medizinischen Forschungsgruppe an, die den hämorrhagischen Schock untersuchte, und entwarf Experimente und Laborgeräte. Er entwickelte Apparaturen zur kontinuierlichen Messung von Puls, Blutdruck, Atemfrequenz und Atemvolumen, dabei bediente er sich auch der Erfahrungen, die er während der Entwicklung seines Flugmotors gemacht hatte.

Im Jahre 1944 nahm er seine Vorlesungen in Cambridge wieder auf. Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg setzte Wittgenstein seine Philosophischen Untersuchungen fort und arbeitete unter anderem an der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung und zu den Themen Gewissheit und Zweifel. Aber auch zu vielen kulturellen und wissenschaftstheoretischen Themen hat Wittgenstein Beiträge geliefert. 1939 schrieb er: „Die Menschen heute glauben, die Wissenschaftler seien da, sie zu belehren, die Dichter und Musiker etc., sie zu erfreuen. Dass diese sie etwas zu lehren haben, kommt ihnen nicht in den Sinn.“

Im Oktober 1947 beendete Wittgenstein seine Tätigkeit an der Universität, um sich ganz seiner Philosophie zu widmen. Er lebte von da an zurückgezogen und verbrachte einige Zeit in Irland. Der Schwerpunkt seiner Arbeiten lag auf der „Philosophie der Psychologie“, die Gegenstand des II. Teils der „Philosophischen Untersuchungen“ wurde. Es ist umstritten, ob die Aufnahme dieser Gedanken in die Philosophischen Untersuchungen dem Willen Wittgensteins entspricht. 1949 konnte er sein zweites Hauptwerk dann abschließen.

Wittgenstein starb 1951 an Krebs. Da er es ablehnte, ins Krankenhaus zu gehen, verlebte er die letzten Wochen im Hause seines Arztes Edward Bevan, der ihn bei sich aufgenommen hatte. Als dessen Frau Wittgenstein am Tag vor seinem Tod mitteilte, seine englischen Freunde würden ihn am nächsten Tag besuchen, soll er gesagt haben: „Sagen Sie ihnen, dass ich ein wundervolles Leben gehabt habe.“ Wittgensteins Grab befindet sich auf dem Ascension Parish Burial Ground-Friedhof in Cambridge.[28]

Werkinterpretationen[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Wittgensteins Philosophie wurde zu verschiedenen Zeiten unterschiedlich wahrgenommen und interpretiert. Ein Grund dafür ist neben anderen, dass er nur ein Werk zu Lebzeiten veröffentlicht hat und dass die Herausgeber der Philosophischen Untersuchungen, was den zweiten Teil betrifft, einige zweifelhafte Entscheidungen getroffen hatten.[29] Auch der schwer zu deutende, aphoristische Stil führt dazu, dass Wittgenstein von teilweise sehr unterschiedlichen philosophischen Schulen vereinnahmt werden konnte. So wurde er von den Mitgliedern des Wiener Kreises so gelesen, als stünde er den Gedanken des Logischen Positivismus nahe. In den 1960er Jahren gab es die Tendenz, in Wittgenstein einen Vertreter oder zumindest Vordenker der Philosophie der normalen Sprache zu sehen. Auch die inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung und technische Interpretation unterliegt noch stetigem Wandel. In der Tractatus-Interpretation stand lange die Frage nach der Natur der Wittgensteinschen Gegenstände im Vordergrund, in der Interpretation seiner späten Philosophie ging es lange um den Begriff der Bedeutung, dann um das Konzept der Sprachspiele und Lebensform, dann um das Problem der Privatsprache und in den 1980er Jahren sah es, was die Rezeptionsgeschichte betrifft, ausgehend von Saul Kripkes Wittgenstein über Regeln und Privatsprache so aus, als seien Wittgensteins Gedanken zum Problem des Regelfolgens der Schlüssel zum Verständnis des Gesamtwerkes.

Seit etwa Mitte der 1990er Jahre wird die Diskussion über Wittgensteins Philosophie beherrscht von Vertretern einer sogenannten resoluten Lesart, die sich gegen eine Standardinterpretation richten. Diese Betrachtung kam mit den Arbeiten Cora Diamonds[30] zum Tractatus auf. Besonders in den USA folgten viele Philosophen Diamond und entwarfen ein teilweise radikal von der Standardinterpretation abweichendes Bild Wittgensteins. Die beiden Hauptmerkmale dieser Richtung, die manchmal als Neuer Wittgenstein[31] bezeichnet wird, sind die strikte Interpretation des Unsinn-Begriffs, der zufolge der gesamte Tractatus (außer dem sogenannten Rahmen, Vorwort und Schlussbemerkungen) im wörtlichen Sinne unsinnig ist, im Gegensatz zu der gewöhnlichen Lesart, nach der die unsinnigen metaphysischen Sätze des Tractatus dennoch tiefe Wahrheiten vermitteln. Wegen dieser strikten Interpretation bezeichnen die Verfechter sich als „resolute“ Leser.[32] Diese Richtung wurde auch „therapeutisch“ genannt, da die Sätze Wittgensteins einen therapeutischen Zweck gehabt hätten. Die zweite Klammer, die die resoluten Leser verbindet, ist die Überzeugung der grundsätzlichen Kontinuität von Wittgensteins Gedanken. Dem gegenüber behaupten die Vertreter der „Standardinterpretation“, mehr oder weniger einheitlich, einen Bruch in der philosophischen Entwicklung Wittgensteins.

Die Auseinandersetzung der beiden Lager geht teilweise über den in der Philosophie üblichen Schlagabtausch hinaus. Der von den resoluten Lesern als Galionsfigur der Standardinterpretation angesehene Peter Hacker nennt es nicht überraschend, dass die neue Interpretation wegen der heute verbreiteten postmodernen Vorliebe für das Paradoxe Anhänger findet.[33] Während James Ferguson Conant, ein Hauptvertreter der resoluten Lesart, ironisch von einem „Schisma“ spricht und entsprechend die Anhänger der neuen Lehre „Ungläubige“ nennt,[34] geht Rupert Read so weit, von „Tractatus-Kriegen“ zu sprechen.[35]

Deutung der Spätphilosophie – Therapie vs. Metaphysik[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Vielfältiger noch als die Ansichten zu Wittgensteins Frühwerk sind die zu seinem Spätwerk, die sich stark widersprechen. Dies liegt auch daran, dass Wittgenstein sein Werk kaum erläutert hat und bis zu seinem Tod um Formulierungen rang:

„Nach manchen missglückten Versuchen, meine Ergebnisse zu einem solchen Ganzen zusammenzuschweißen, sah ich ein, dass mir dies nie gelingen würde. Dass das Beste, was ich schreiben konnte, immer nur philosophische Bemerkungen bleiben würden; dass meine Gedanken bald erlahmten, wenn ich versuchte, sie, gegen ihre natürliche Richtung, in ‚einer‘ Richtung weiterzuzwingen.“[36]

Wittgensteins meist kurze Dialoge in seinem Spätwerk gelten als stilistisch brillant. Als problematisch für das Verständnis wird angesehen, dass sein Zugang traditionslos ist; besonders der späte Wittgenstein hat in der Philosophiegeschichte keine Vorläufer und stiftet eine neue, beispiellose Art zu denken. Viele meinen daher, diese Art zu denken müsse erlernt werden wie eine fremde Sprache.

Nur wenige Philosophen haben so beißend über das Philosophieren geurteilt wie Wittgenstein in seinem späten Denken. Er hielt die „großen philosophischen Probleme“ letztlich für „Geistesstörungen“, die unter anderem entstünden, „indem man philosophiere“. Sie würden dadurch zu fixen Ideen, die einen nicht mehr loslassen – in der Regel, weil wir uns in einen unzuträglichen Sprachgebrauch verrannt haben. „Es ist eine Hauptquelle unseres Unverständnisses, daß wir den Gebrauch unserer Wörter nicht übersehen“ heißt es in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen, der Hauptquelle seiner späten Philosophie.

Die Ähnlichkeit der Sätze „Ich habe einen Stuhl“, „Ich habe einen Eindruck“, „Ich habe Zahnschmerzen“ verführt zur Auffassung, man „habe“ Eindrücke oder Empfindungen in gleicher Weise wie „Stühle“ (raumeinnehmende Gegenstände, deren Besitz man durch Verkauf oder Einäscherung verlieren kann) – wodurch sich das Bild aufdrängt, Wörter wie „Eindruck“, „Empfindung“ oder auch „Gedanke“, „Zahl“ müssten wie „Stuhl“ für irgendwie Raumeinnehmendes – wenn nicht Sichtbares, dann Unsichtbares – stehen: etwa für „Ideen“ oder das, was man durch „Nachschauen“ in seinem „Innersten erblicken“ könne. Wittgenstein zielt darauf ab, solche unwillkürlichen Bilder (die hier etwa einen „inneren Raum“ mit „unsichtbaren Gegenständen“ suggerieren) zu überwinden, indem er zum Beispiel ihre Entstehung ins Bewusstsein hebt. Sein Philosophieren hat, wie er sagt, mit der „Entdeckung“ (und dadurch Entschärfung) „schlichten Unsinns“ zu tun, infolgedessen sich der Verstand „Beulen“ – „beim Anrennen an die Grenzen der Sprache“ – geholt habe.

Bis zu diesem Punkt sind sich die Interpreten einig, neigen dann aber dazu, die Schlussfolgerungen, die Wittgenstein zieht, unterschiedlich zu deuten. Seine „Philosophie“, sagt er, lasse „alles, wie es ist“ – stelle „alles bloß hin“ und folgere nicht. „Da alles offen“ liege, sei folglich „nichts zu erklären.“

„Wollte man Thesen in der Philosophie aufstellen, es könnte nie über sie zur Diskussion kommen, weil Alle mit ihnen einverstanden wären.“ Darüber, wie dies Diktum zu verstehen sei, bilden die Interpreten zwei Schulen. Die eine betont, Wittgenstein liege keineswegs daran, uns bislang verborgene Zusammenhänge der Welt zu „erklären“; er wolle ausschließlich Übel oder Schwindel auslösende Fixierungen oder Paradoxa des Denkens lösen. Im Folgenden wird diese Lesart die entzaubernde oder therapeutische Auffassung[37] genannt. Eine andere Schule findet dagegen, Wittgenstein habe zwar nichts Welterklärendes, aber durchaus Bestimmtes im Hinblick etwa auf die Grenzen von Sinn beobachtet. Entscheidend sei dazu seine neue Art der Aufklärung und Begründung: die „Grammatik“beschreibung. Wobei Wittgenstein unter „Grammatik“ etwas über Normen der Wortverwendung Hinausgehendes verstehe, das man mit „Gepflogenheiten“, „Lebensform“ (oder „Programm“) übersetzen könne. Er nenne es „Grammatik“, insofern es sich dabei um etwas Geregeltes, etwas Lernbares handle, auf das Anwender „abgerichtet“ werden könnten. Hinter diese Grammatik lasse sich nach Wittgenstein nicht zurückgehen; sie sei absolut. Diese Auffassung, die beim späten Wittgenstein hauptsächlich Grammatik-Beschreibungen (Sinneingrenzungen) interpretiert, heißt im Folgenden metaphysisch,[38] da es ihr um die „letzten Dinge“ geht: das, was grundlos hinzunehmen ist.

Laut dem lösungsorientiert-therapeutischen Zugang wird man Wittgensteins Spätwerk nicht gerecht, wenn man versucht, die unmittelbare Beschreibung von etwas Absolutem daraus abzulesen. Wittgenstein hat, so heißt es hier, dergleichen nirgends beschrieben, sondern – im Gegenteil – Verfahren entworfen (nie vorgeschrieben, immer nur vorgeschlagen) zur Lösung von geisteslähmenden Absolutheitsanmutungen, deren Wurzel er in der unhinterfragten Annahme bestimmter Bilder sah. Unter „Bild“ habe er die Verfestigung einer bestimmten Auffassung zu etwas Selbstverständlichem, Unhinterfragbarem, eben „Absolutem“ verstanden, Vorstellungen wie beispielsweise, Zahlen stünden für Gegenstände – oder man müsse die Zeit wie Raum vermessen können. Die Anwesenheit von Emphase oder Modaloperatoren zeige nach Wittgenstein immer auf ein Bild: etwas Verabsolutiertes.

Wittgensteins Lösungsverfahren entwickelt nun zum Beispiel Vergleichsobjekte, um den Bann eines „Bildes“ zu brechen. Ein philosophisches Problem infolge eines solcherart den Verstand lähmenden Bildes sei etwa das Messen von Zeit. Das seiner Ansicht nach problematische Bild ist hier das des Meterstabes, der das, was er vermisst, bereits einnimmt: Raum. Wie ist es so aber möglich, Zeit zu messen? Mit welchem „Meterstab“, der Zeit – Vergangenheit wie Zukunft – bereits einnähme? Zeit lässt sich also nicht messen! Was ist dann aber eine Stunde? Wittgenstein löst das Gefühl der Unsicherheit, indem er ein anderes „Vergleichsobjekt“ vorstellt: Man solle Zeitmessen mit Raummessen nicht durch Meterstab, sondern Abschreiten vergleichen. Wittgenstein sage nicht, betont das Lager der Anhänger der sogenannten therapeutischen Lesart, Zeitmessen sei ein Abschreiten von Raum; er stelle lediglich als Beispiel einen anderen Vergleichsgegenstand vor: Man könne Zeitmessen auch analog zum Raummessen mittels Abschreiten – statt Meterstabverwendung – sehen. So löse sich der Krampf. „Die eigentliche Entdeckung ist die, die mich fähig macht, das Philosophieren abzubrechen, wann ich will … Es wird nun an Beispielen eine Methode gezeigt, und die Reihe dieser Beispiele kann man abbrechen. – Es werden Probleme gelöst (Schwierigkeiten beseitigt), nicht ein Problem“.[39]

Für die Anhänger der „metaphysischen“ Lesart ist dieser Zugang Wittgensteins eine Weiterung von Fähigkeiten, die erst einmal erworben sein wollen – vor allem die Methode der hinnehmenden Veranschaulichung von Sprachspielen, ihrer „Grammatik“ (z. B. die der „Meterstabverwendung“). Dafür habe Wittgenstein bevorzugt einerseits den Verwendungszusammenhang einiger Zentral-Begriffe dargestellt und so etwa die Bedeutung von „Bedeutung“ oder „Regel“ für seine Herangehensweise erhellt, während er andererseits z. B. mit „Sprachspiel“ oder „Familienähnlichkeit“ auch spezifische Begriffe seiner Methode unter Verwendung teilweise für deren Veranschaulichung erfundener Sprachspiele etabliert und hinreichend bestimmt. Das Wesen überhaupt aller Begriffe erkläre sich laut Wittgenstein durchgängig aus der Darstellung ihres Verwendungszusammenhangs oder Sprachspiels, wozu auch Betrachtungen nach der philologischen oder historisch-kritischen Methode gehörten, respektive Deutungen, Vergleiche von Entwicklungsstadien und Kritik.

Die „Metaphysiker“ sind dementsprechend der Meinung, „Sprachspiel“ sei ein zentraler Begriff der Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins; Lebenswirklichkeit zerfalle nach Wittgenstein unhintergehbar in beschreibbare „Regelkreise“. In der Philosophie gehe es darum, deren „Grammatik“ – paradigmatisch oder im Zusammenspiel heterogener Beispiele – darzustellen. Dies geschehe dann mit manchmal verblüffenden Ergebnissen. So ergäbe sich etwa aus dem verdeutlichten Verwendungszusammenhang von „Traum“, dass damit nichts Privates, sondern nur ein bestimmter zwischenmenschlicher Verlauf gemeint sein könne. Und es erweise sich, dass Äußerungen der ersten Person Singular keinen Wahrheitswert hätten.

Den Metaphysikern geht es ferner um die Verdeutlichung des nach ihrem Wittgenstein-Verständnis begriffsschöpfenden Weltbilds einer jeden Lebensform. „Man könnte sich vorstellen“, zitieren sie Wittgensteins Über Gewißheit, „dass gewisse Sätze von der Form der Erfahrungssätze erstarrt wären und als Leitung für die nicht erstarrten, flüssigen Erfahrungssätze funktionieren; und dass sich dies Verhältnis mit der Zeit änderte, indem flüssige Sätze erstarren und feste flüssig werden.“ Die metaphysische Haltung blickt auf die gerade erstarrten Sätze, um anhand ihrer akuten Sinn von akutem Unsinn abzugrenzen: Offensichtliches festzustellen wie etwa, dass „Steine nicht denken können“ – aber auch weniger Offensichtliches, etwa wieweit man sinnvoll von „künstlicher Intelligenz“ reden kann. Wittgensteins Spätwerk fasziniert und beschäftigt nicht nur Sprachphilosophen, sondern auch Psychiater und Psychologen. Die Ideen Wittgensteins fordern nach Ansicht mancher geradezu dazu auf, in psychotherapeutischen Verfahren angewendet zu werden.

Aus streng „therapeutischer“ Sicht verkürzen die „Metaphysiker“ die Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins. So gesehen gehe es ihm nicht darum, Richtiges von Falschem, erlaubten von nicht-erlaubtem Sprachgebrauch, Sinn von Unsinn abzugrenzen, indem er nachweisend darstellte, was „richtig“, „erlaubt“ oder „sinnvoll“ ist. Wenn Wittgenstein über die Bedeutung von Wörtern spricht, hat dies gemäß der therapeutischen Auffassung nicht den Zweck, eine korrekte Bestimmung von Begriffen zu schaffen, sondern den, einen intellektuellen Krampf zu lösen, wie er in folgender Aussage zum Ausdruck kommt: „Was ist denn nun das Wesen von ‚gut‘? Es muss doch eine bestimmende Eigenschaft geben, sonst ist doch alles relativ!“

Die Diskussion des Begriffes „Sprachspiel“ steht in engem Zusammenhang mit der des Begriffs „Bedeutung“: In den Philosophischen Untersuchungen heißt es in § 43: „Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache.“ Im vorhergehenden Satz bemerkt Wittgenstein jedoch einschränkend: „Man kann für eine große Klasse von Fällen der Benützung des Wortes Bedeutung – wenn auch nicht für alle Fälle seiner Benützung – dieses Wort so erklären: Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache“. Die unterschiedliche Lesart der oben genannten Textpassage zeigt die unterschiedlichen Zugänge von „Therapeuten“ und „Metaphysikern“.

Die „metaphysische“ Sicht: Wittgenstein nimmt eine Bestimmung von „Bedeutung“ (des Wesens des mit dieser Buchstabenkette gekennzeichneten Begriffes) vor. Dementsprechend ist die Aufgabe nun, eine konsistente Position aus Wittgensteins Werken zu extrahieren. Auch wenn Definitionen bei Wittgenstein fast nie „klassisch“ durch die Angabe bestimmender Merkmale erfolgen, sondern von ihm – oft reihenweise – Veranschaulichendes dargestellt wird, in dessen Ähnlichkeit oder Zusammenklang der bestimmte Begriff dann „erscheint“ (Familienähnlichkeit, ein letztlich offenes Verfahren, das keine scharfen Grenzen vorsieht), wird letztlich auch damit immer etwas – und, das sei sogar Wittgensteins Pointe: auch immer hinreichend – bestimmt. § 43 der Philosophischen Untersuchungen wäre also durchaus als Definition aufzufassen; das einschränkende „nicht für alle Fälle“ sei eher als Index auf weitere Bestimmungen von „Bedeutung“ durch den Autor zu lesen, etwa in Teil II der Philosophischen Untersuchungen, wo Wittgenstein in den Ansätzen einer Philosophie der Psychologie die „sekundäre Bedeutung“ beschreibt als eine haltungsbestimmte Form des Erlebens der primären, die schlicht im Gebrauch des Wortes besteht. Da es keine über „primäre“ und „sekundäre“ hinausgehende Verwendung des Begriffs „Bedeutung“ im Spätwerke Wittgensteins gibt, neigen die Anhänger der metaphysischen Interpretation zur Auffassung, dass Wittgenstein keine weitere Interpretation vorsieht und „Bedeutung“ insofern erschöpfend bestimmt wurde.

Im Gegensatz dazu vertreten Anhänger des „therapeutischen“ Ansatzes die Meinung, Wittgenstein sei es in § 43 nicht darum gegangen, Kern und Wesen von „Bedeutung“ zu bestimmen. Die Einschränkung „nicht für alle Fälle“ sei kein Verweis auf andere Textstellen im Spätwerk des Autors, sondern hebe vielmehr hervor, dass die folgende Bestimmung nichts Immerwährendes skizziere, sondern vielmehr einen möglichen Gegenstand, der das Potenzial besitze, in einem Denkkrämpfe verursachenden Bild, indem es mit ihm verglichen werde, Lösungsaspekte aufzuzeigen. So könnte es z. B. befreiend wirken, die Bedeutung von „Vorstellung“ oder „Zahnschmerzen“ nicht wie die von „Stuhl“ oder „Auto“ in etwas Raumeinnehmendem zu sehen, sondern stattdessen zu versuchen, Parallelen zwischen dem mit „Vorstellung“ oder „Zahnschmerzen“ Gemeinten und geregelten Verlaufsformen („Spielen“: deren Zügen …) zu sehen. Gemäß der lösungsorientiert-therapeutischen Haltung lautet die entscheidende Frage nicht, wie sich verschiedene Bestimmungen des Bedeutungsbegriffs ergänzen oder addieren, sondern ob die von „Therapeuten“ entworfenen Gegenstände – indem man das, was einen verwirrt, mit ihnen vergleicht – in der Lage sind, Lösungen aufzuzeigen.

Verhältnis von Früh- zu Spätwerk[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Der Widerstreit der Spätphilosophie-Deutungen überträgt sich auch auf die Einschätzung der Kontinuität in Wittgensteins Denken überhaupt. Die „Therapeuten“ neigen zur Annahme der Kontinuität zwischen der unbedingten Position der Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung (Tractatus, TLP) und den Entkrampfungsverfahren der Philosophischen Untersuchungen (PU). Für die „Metaphysiker“ herrscht zwischen Früh- und Spätphilosophie ein Bruch.

Fliegengläser

In Wittgensteins Spätwerk zerfallen die Welt und die sie abbildende Sprache nicht mehr in unauflösbare Dinge und deren logisch mögliche Verknüpfung in Sachverhalte oder Sätze. Nicht mehr die zeitlosen Kombinationsvorgaben der Logik bestimmen den Sprachbau. Vielmehr vergleicht Wittgenstein die Sprache nun mit einer „alten Stadt“: „Ein Gewinkel von Gässchen und Plätzen, alten und neuen Häusern mit Zubauten aus verschiedenen Zeiten: und dies umgeben von einer Menge Vororte mit geraden und regelmäßigen Straßen und mit einförmigen Häusern.“[40] Dennoch blieb für ihn die Sprache, ihre „Grammatik“, der Raum des Denkens und der Wirklichkeit. „Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache.“[41] Gebrauch aber ist die Funktion eines Ensembles von Gepflogenheiten oder einer „Lebensform“, die in „Sprachspiele“ zerfällt. „Das Wort ‚Sprachspiel‘ soll hier hervorheben, dass das Sprechen der Sprache ein Teil ist einer Tätigkeit, oder einer Lebensform.“[42] Mediziner haben andere Sprachspiele als Handwerker oder Kaufleute, Agnostiker andere als Gläubige. Aufgabe der Philosophie bleibt demnach die Auseinandersetzung dieses oder jenes Sprachgebrauchs. „Die Philosophie ist ein Kampf gegen die Verhexung unseres Verstandes durch die Mittel unserer Sprache.“[43] Gegenstand der Philosophie ist die Alltagssprache. „Wir führen die Wörter von ihrer metaphysischen auf ihre alltägliche Verwendung zurück.“[44] Der Zweck der Philosophie ist eine Therapie. „Der Philosoph behandelt eine Frage, wie eine Krankheit.“[45] Der in einer Sprachverwirrung gefangene Mensch soll wieder befreit werden. „Was ist dein Ziel in der Philosophie? Der Fliege den Ausweg aus dem Fliegenglas zeigen.“[46] Die späte Philosophie Wittgensteins ersetzt den Begriff „Logik“ durch „Grammatik“. Der Unterschied besteht darin, dass im Gegensatz zur Logik die „Grammatik“ als Ensemble von Gepflogenheiten einer Lebensform „Veränderungen unterworfen ist“. Die Gemeinsamkeit besteht darin, dass weder Logik noch „Grammatik“ erklärbar sind, sondern beide sich in dem, was sie ausmachen, lediglich zeigen.

Schließlich identifizieren die „Metaphysiker“ in Wittgensteins Früh- wie Spätwerk eine anticartesianische Ablehnung des Dualismus von privater „Innenwelt“ und öffentlicher „Außenwelt“ sowie des subjektzentrierten Denkens überhaupt, nicht zuletzt durch das Auslassen jeglicher Erkenntnistheorie oder Transzendentalphilosophie.

Literarische Rezeption von Wittgensteins Biographie[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Thomas Bernhard greift in seinem nach den beiden Schauspielerinnen und ihrem Kollegen der Uraufführung benannten Theaterstück Ritter, Dene, Voss[47] (Uraufführung: 18. August 1986 in Salzburg) die Familiensituation Ludwig Wittgensteins auf und verbindet sie mit dessen Neffen Paul, der mehrmals in der psychiatrischen Klinik Am Steinhof bei Wien behandelt wurde und dem er seine Erinnerungen Wittgensteins Neffe (1982) widmete. Auch seine eigene Kritik an der österreichischen Gesellschaft des 20. Jahrhunderts legt der Autor dem Protagonisten in den Mund. Das Drama spielt im Speisezimmer der herrschaftlichen Villa der Großindustriellenfamilie Worringer. Ludwig, der nach einem Aufenthalt in Skandinavien und nach philosophischen Studien an einer englischen Universität wegen seiner psychischen Labilität im Krankenhaus „Steinhof“ lebte, kehrt für kurze Zeit ins von seinen beiden Schwestern bewohnte Haus zurück. Unterbrochen von grotesken Wutausbrüchen rechnet er, im Bernhardschen Stil, mit seinen Eltern, dem Großbürgertum und, in einem Rundumschlag, mit dem Medizin-, Kunst- und Wissenschaftsbetrieb ab.

In Libuše Moníkovás autobiografisch unterlegtem Roman Treibeis[48] ist Wittgensteins Tätigkeit als Volksschullehrer (1920–1926) rezipiert. Jan Prantl, einer der beiden Protagonisten (Prantl und Karla, beide tschechische Exilanten), nimmt in der zweiten Station der Handlung an einem internationalen pädagogischen Kongress am Semmering teil. Zwei Wissenschaftler aus Cambridge nutzen den Aufenthalt, um Wittgenstein-Souvenirs wie Zeugnisse, Schreibhefte und Bücher seiner ehemaligen Schüler in Trattenbach und anderen Dörfern (Puchberg) aufzukaufen (Kp. 3) und dem Seminar ihre Augenzeugenbefragungen über die Lehrertätigkeit des Philosophen vorzutragen (z. B. Affekthandlungen wie Züchtigungen, andererseits Idealismus: finanzielle Unterstützung und Förderung mathematisch begabter Schüler, Erarbeitung einer Grundwortschatzsammlung für die Rechtschreibung), die, parodistisch erzählt, von den Teilnehmern unter unterschiedlichen Aspekten diskutiert werden (Kp. 5): biografisch (Familie, Autismus, Ausgrenzung und Verspottung durch Mitschüler in Linz, Kriegsverletzung), historisch-soziologisch (armselige Gebirgsdörfer Niederösterreichs: Trattenbach, Puchberg und Otterthal), reformpädagogisch (zwar Mitwirkung der Schüler bei Herstellung der Wörterbücher, aber keine inhaltliche Beteiligung, einerseits lebensfremde mathematische Textaufgaben, andererseits sorgfältig vorbereitete Ausflüge). Der Kongressleiter fasst als Ergebnis zusammen: „Er mag ein engagierter, vielleicht sogar guter Lehrer gewesen sein. Ein Pädagoge war er nicht!“[49]

Erheblichen Einfluss hatte Wittgensteins Philosophie auf das Werk von David Foster Wallace.[50]

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